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Class Actions and Group Litigation in
Switzerland

Samuel P. Baumgartner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions have gone global. Once limited to the United States in
terms of both scholarly interest and practical effects, class action litigation
has captured the attention of foreign academics and law reformers.' Indeed,
some foreign jurisdictions have already adopted representative litigation
devices inspired by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.2 Conversely,
Americans have begun to take an interest in the group litigation landscape
abroad, including the reasons why some countries reject American-style
class actions outright.3 Foreign parties are no longer a rarity in U.S. class
litigation. In addition to being named as defendants, foreigners increasingly
form a significant part of the group of absent class members.4 Moreover,
the emergence of the human rights class action has led to the large-scale
involvement of foreigners in public law litigation. 5 U.S. courts have thus
* Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law, Akron, Ohio. I would like to
thank Steve Burbank, Kevin Clermont, Sarah Cravens, and Fridolin Walther for helpful
comments. All translations are my own.
1 See, e.g., RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS

(2004); Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for ContinentalEurope? A
PreliminaryInquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 269-70 (1993); Antonio Gidi, Class
Actions in Brazil-A Modelfor Civil Law Countries,51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311 (2003); Roberth
Nordh, Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need
for Reforms, and a ForthcomingProposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 381 (2001).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
3 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons From Abroad, Complexity and Convergence, 46
VILL. L. REV. 1 (2001); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Debates Over Group Litigation in
Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn From Each Other?, 1I DUKE J. COMp. &
INT'L L. 157 (2001).
4 See, e.g., liana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a
Globalized Economy--Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of Class Action
Lawsuits in the U.S. FederalCourt, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563 (2005).
5 See, e.g., Paul R. Dubinsky, Justicefor the Collective: The Limits of the Human Rights
Class Action, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1152 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST
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begun to consider some novel issues, including whether due process6
requires foreigners to be treated as an opt-in rather than an opt-out class;
whether a judgment or settlement in the suit is capable of being enforced or
recognized as res judicata abroad and thus whether class certification is
justified in the first place; 7 and whether a foreign forum grants comparable
access to justice in the form of group litigation and thus represents an
adequate alternative forum for purposes of a forum non conveniens
defense.8
In short, litigants and courts have recognized that global class actions
may present distinct issues and require approaches different from purely
domestic cases. As I have argued elsewhere, decisions on this score require
great care because:
The law applicable to transnational litigation affects the behavior of

transnational actors, that is, groups and individuals who are both
subject to the laws of more than one sovereign and have access to
more than one sovereign to have their interests counted, and who in
turn may affect the international as well as domestic law of
transnational litigation both abroad and at home in the future. If
JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS (2003); STUART E. EIZENSTAT,
IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUsINESS OF
WORLD WAR 11 (2003)); Kevin R. Johnson, InternationalHuman Rights Class Actions: New
Frontiersfor Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 643 (2004); Beth Van Schaack,
Unfulfilled Promise: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279 (2003).
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(199 1) (discussing public law litigation involving foreign parties and actions abroad).
6 See, e.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that an opt-in
class for foreign class members is neither permissible under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure nor required by the due process clause); Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions
Go Global, TransnationalClass Actions and PersonalJurisdiction,72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41
(2003) (arguing that due process requires opt-in class for foreign class members).
7 See, e.g., In re Daimler-Chrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 300-1 (D. Del.
2003) (refusing to include foreigners in the certified class); Ansari v. N.Y. Univ., 179 F.R.D.
112, 116-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that, together with lack of proof to meet numerosity
requirement, foreigners in the plaintiff class and attendant possibility of non-recognition of
judgment render certification impermissible). But see, e.g., In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund
Litig., No. 96 CIV. 1262 (RWS) 1998 WL 50211 at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998) (surmising
that given the res' situs in New York, a foreign court would still use the Southern District's
judgment as "guidance," thus rendering certification possible); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69
F.R.D. 24, 48-54 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (rejecting defendant's argument that certification should
be impermissible due to the large number of foreign plaintiffs in the proposed class against
whom a U.S. judgment would have no res judicata effect in their respective home countries).
See also Currie v. McDonalds Rests. of Can., Ltd., [2005] 74 O.R. (3d) 321, 321-22 (Can.)
(holding that settlement of Illinois class action does not have res judicata effects in Ontario
and thus does not prevent class members from bringing a class action in Ontario).
8 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that absence
of class action device does not ordinarily render a foreign forum inadequate for forum non
conveniens purposes).
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those in charge of making and applying the law of transnational
litigation want to be in control of their efforts, they need to be aware
of this interplay between lawmaking and transnational actors and of
how particular procedural choices may influence it in the long run.9
Knowledge about the relevant foreign procedure, institutions, and
jurisprudential values thus becomes crucial for decision-making in this
area.1 ° Only with that information will courts and lawmakers in the United
States be able to get a sense of what possible reactions a particular approach
or decision is likely to cause abroad and thus whether that approach is likely
to further the chosen process values in the United States in the long run.
Moreover, such information may benefit those who engage in the rare but
growing American sport of gaining comparative perspective in procedural
lawmaking. "
In what follows, I hope to contribute to that information with a look at
group litigation devices in Switzerland. To begin with, Switzerland is one
of the many countries that do not currently have an American-style class
action.' 2 Suggestions to examine the possibility of introducing such a
procedural vehicle have met with considerable opposition. 3 Some of the
reasons for that opposition are grounded in reactions to litigation in the
United States.' 4 More broadly, however, there seems to be a general unease
with civil litigation involving more than the traditional plaintiff and
defendant and an occasional individual joined out of an urgent need, such as
to extend res judicata effect to a co-heir or business partner. Below, I
intend to explore the most important reasons for that reluctance. I will do
so first by analyzing the proposals to introduce an American-style class
9 Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L

ECON. L. 1297, 1305-06 (2004) [hereinafter Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation]
(footnote omitted).
'oSee id. at 1385-90.
1 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Exceptionalism into a Globalized
Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005) (reviewing ALI/UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (2006); NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE
(2003); CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (2004); Kuo-CHANG
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003); PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF
STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004); ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003));

Mullenix, supra note 3; Rowe supra note 3. But see John H. Langbein, The Influence of
Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 545 (1995) ("My

report is short and sad: The study of comparative procedure has little following in academia,
and virtually no audience in the courts or in legal policy circles.").
12 See, e.g., Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE

J. COMP. & INT'L L. 369, 369
introduction of a class-action-like
text accompanying notes 241-43.
13See infra text accompanying
14 See infra text accompanying

(2001). Technically, this changed in 2004 with the
device with a very limited area of application. See infra
notes 42-53.
notes 80-97.
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action and their rejection. I will then take a closer look at the group
litigation devices that already exist in Swiss procedure. They include
devices to let similarly situated individuals sue together (joinder of parties),
to have an organization sue for its members with similar rights
(Verbandsklage and Verbandsbeschwerde), and to allow a court to
consolidate claims arising out of the same controversy. Moreover, certain
shareholder litigation results in judgments that are binding on all or an
extended group of shareholders. As my analysis below demonstrates,
however, even these devices have been interpreted narrowly by the courts
and used with little aggressiveness by litigants.
At the same time, however, these existing devices do not seem to
satisfy all of the litigants' needs in practice. In several cases, litigants have
begun to use test cases. Other plaintiffs have simply created ad-hoc
associations for the purpose of gaining leverage in pursuing their claims in
shareholder litigation. Moreover, in partial response to these practical
needs, there has been a proliferation of statutes introducing or extending
circumscribed group action rights in specific subject areas during the last
decade. At the same time, political opposition has arisen against group
action rights in administrative proceedings involving environmental
protection claims.
The result is a patchwork of interlocking state and federal law that is
complicated by the traditional civil law separation between civil and
administrative tribunals and the respective procedural rules of those
tribunals. However, few in Switzerland have undertaken the task of
examining in depth whether this patchwork of group litigation devices
suffices to meet the procedural values underlying the current system or,
indeed, what exactly those values are and whether they are adequate for
twenty-first century Swiss society.' 5 This is unfortunate since Switzerland
is currently in the process of drafting the first federal civil procedure code
in its history, a unique opportunity, it would seem, to reexamine the
premises of the existing procedural system.

15

As I have stated elsewhere:

Despite prominent attempts to relegate 'adjective law' to the status of a 'handmaid
of justice,' students of procedure have long since realized, and empirical studies
have confirmed, that no matter what its features, procedural law affects the rights
and the behavior of groups and individuals-including those involved in the
administration of justice. It is therefore important that those in charge of applying
and devising procedural rules continuously reflect upon the values that those rules
serve or ought to serve. Equally important, procedural lawmakers must regularly
assess the effectiveness of our approaches to civil litigation in furthering the
chosen process values.
Baumgartner, TransnationalLitigation,supra note 9, at 1298-1300 (footnotes omitted).
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In Part I1of this Article, I will sketch the respective lawmaking powers
of the Swiss federal and state governments. In Part III, I will then explicate
the various group litigation devices available and explore the reasons for the
reluctance to expand on those devices in the current effort to draft a Federal
Code of Civil Procedure, including by introducing an American-style class
action. Moreover, due to the absence of empirical data on the use of
existing group litigation devices in Switzerland today, I have undertaken to
get at least a preliminary sense of the usage rates and the kinds of cases
involved in such litigation by sifting through the published decisions of the
Swiss Supreme Court. The results of that research are included in Part III.
II. THE SETTING
Switzerland is a parliamentary democracy 16 with a federal form of
government. Governmental power is shared by the federal government and
the twenty-six cantons (or states). Private law has been a matter of federal
legislative power at least since a constitutional amendment extended that
power to all areas of private law in 1898.1 7 Civil procedure and the8
organization of the courts, however, remained the province of state law.1
Only in 2000, with the adoption of a new federal constitution and its
immediate amendment, did the federal government receive the power to
legislate in the area of civil procedure as well as in private law. 19 Since that
change, the Swiss government has been working on a new Federal Code of

16 One

could quibble with this characterization to the extent that the executive, the

Federal Council, does not entirely serve at the pleasure of the legislature. Although elected
by the legislature, "[t]he members of the council are elected individually for a fixed term of
four years, and according to the Constitution, the legislature cannot stage a vote of no
confidence during that period." JURG STEINER, AMICABLE AGREEMENT VERSUS MAJORITY
RULE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SWITZERLAND 43 (Asger Braendgaard & Barbara
Braendgaard trans., rev. & enlarged ed., Univ. of. N.C. Press, 1974) (1970).
17Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [aBV], [aCst] [Constitution
of 1874] May 29, 1874, AS 1 (1875) as amended on Nov. 13, 1898, art. 64 (11)(Switz.). I
say "at least" because subsection (1) of that Article already provided for federal power in
various areas of private law, including the law of obligations and intellectual property.
However, the Constitution of 1848, on which the 1874 Constitution is based, left all
legislation in private law to the states.
"8Id. art. 64(111). There is one important exception: The procedure for enforcing money
judgments and uncontested monetary claims, including bankruptcy law, is a matter of federal
law. Id. art. 64(l).
19 BUNDESVERFASSUNG DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [BV] [Constitution]
Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, as amended on Mar. 12, 2000, art. 122 (Switz.). In an unusual
arrangement, the amendment is not to enter into force until so decided by the federal
legislature. This is planned to happen together with the entering into force of the new civil
procedure code. See Bundesbeschluss uber die Reform der Justiz of Oct. 8, 1999, ch. I11, AS
2002, 3148; Fridolin M.R. Walther, Die Schweiz und das europaischeZivilprozessrecht-quo
vadis?, 124 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT [ZSR] 11301, 307 n.31 (2005).
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Civil Procedure that is intended to displace the existing cantonal codes.2 °
As one would expect, the effort has required a significant amount of labor.
Moreover, the first draft of the Committee of Experts appointed by the2
executive has resulted in the criticism of numerous proposed provisions. 1
Although the official proposal of the Federal Council to Parliament has just
been released,22 the project is likely to take a few more years of legislative
debate, followed by a brief grace period, during which the cantons can
adapt their laws to the new Federal Code.2 3 It is therefore likely that the
promulgation of this new Federal Code will continue at all deliberate speed.
In the meantime, any analysis of Swiss procedural law must take into
account the current system of twenty-six different state procedural codes,
each with its own interpretations by the relevant state courts. Fortunately
for the analyzing scholar-and to the frustration of some cantons-federal
lawmakers have increasingly included procedural provisions in substantive
statutes. 224 The Federal Supreme Court, the only federal court in the
country,2 5 has followed suit by displacing state procedural law step by step
with federal common law in areas as important as personal jurisdiction and
res judicata, so as to assure the enforcement of substantive federal law.26
20 In fact, then-Minister of Justice Koller impaneled the Committee of Experts that
produced the first draft in 2003 on April 26, 1999, almost a full year before the new federal
power over civil procedure was approved by popular referendum. See Schweizerische
Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO], Bericht zum Vorentwurf der Expertentkommission, June 2003,
6 (Switz.), available at http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/staatbuerger/gesetzge
bung/zivilprozess.Par.0006.File.tmp/vn-ber-d.pdf [hereinafter Begleitbericht].
21The reactions to the project that were directed to the Justice Department are collected
in a 956-page document called Zusammenstellung der Vernehmlassungen, Vorentwurf ffir
ein Bundesgesetz tiber die ZPO (2004), available at http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/
data/staatbuerger/gesetzgebung/zivilprozess.Par.0004.File.tmp/ve-ber.pdf
[hereinafter
Vemehmlassungsbericht].
22 Botschaft zur schweizerischen Zivilprozessordung, June 28, 2006, BB1 7221 (2006)
(Switz.), available at http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/staat buerger/gesetzgebung/
zivilprozess.Par.0010.File.tmp/20060628-bot-ZPO-d.pdf [hereinafter Botschaft].
23See Bundesgesetz iber die Bereinigung und Aktualisierung der Totalrevision der
Bundesrechtspflege June 23, 2006, BBI 2006, 5799 (subject to possible popular referendum,
see infra note 63); Walther, supra note 19, at 311.
24 See, e.g., OSCAR VOGEL ET AL., GRUNDRISS DES ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS UND DES
1NTERNATIONALEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS IN DER SCHWEIZ 62-67 (8th ed. 2006); Hans Peter

Walter,

Bundesprivatrecht

und

kantonales

Zivilprozessrecht,

Tendenzen

der

Rechtsprechung, 1995 BASLER JURISTISCHE MrFFEILUNGEN 281 (1995).

25 Since the creation of a lower federal criminal court in Bellinzona by federal legislation
in 2002 and that court's beginning of operations in April 2004, this is technically no longer
true in the area of criminal law. See Bundesgesetz Ober das Bundesstrafgericht Oct. 4, 2002,
SR 173.71 (Switz.). Similarly, the federal legislature created a new lower federal
administrative court, which has yet to begin work, in 2005. See Bundesgesetz Uber das
Bundesverwaltungsgericht June 17, 2005, AS 2005, 4093.
26 See, e.g., VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 68-71; STEPHEN BERTI, ZUM EINFLUSS
AUF DEN KANTONALEN Z1IvLPROZESS IM LICHTE DER

UNGESCHRIEBENEN BUNDESRECHTS
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Group actions represent one area in which both federal statutes and federal
common law have proliferated. The drawback of this situation is that it is
not always entirely clear how far federal law reaches and thus precisely
which rules of state law it displaces.
A somewhat different distribution of power between the federal and
state governments exists in the area of administrative procedure. As in
other civil law countries, a sharp separation exists in Switzerland between
private and public law and, more importantly, between judges adjudicating,
and scholars studying, civil litigation on the one hand and administrative
cases on the other.2 Yet, any consideration of group actions, in which
plaintiffs tend to represent a stronger public interest than in individual civil
claims, 28 should involve discussion of administrative procedure as well as
civil litigation. 29 This is particularly true since entire classes of claims that
proceed in civil court in the United States, where there are no specialized
administrative courts in the civil law sense, 30 would be considered publiclaw cases and thus litigated in administrative courts in Switzerland and
other civil law countries. 3' Much of the U.S. civil rights litigation, for
RECHTSPRECHUNG DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS (1989).

27 See, e.g., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 300-01 (5th ed. 1988).

To clarify to U.S. readers: administrative litigation in Switzerland almost exclusively
involves cases in which a public agency applies law and/or administrative rules to an
individual situation. As part of that litigation, the plaintiff can argue that an administrative
rule violates constitutional or statutory law (or federal law in a state administrative case).
Administrative rulemaking itself, however, is not generally subject to judicial review. Cf
Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1279, 1289-96 (1994), much of whose description of German
administrative procedure is fairly accurate for that of Switzerland as well. See, e.g., FRITZ
GYGI, BUNDESVERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE 227-28 (2d ed. 1983). However, administrative

rules themselves may be the subject of a constitutional appeal to the Federal Supreme Court
to the extent they directly impact individuals and if those individuals may not be reasonably
expected to wait for an appealable decision applying the regulation by the agency in
question. See, e.g., WALTER KALIN, DAS VERFAHREN DER STAATSRECHTLICHEN BESCHWERDE
142-44 (2d ed. 1994).
28 See, e.g., Reinhard Greger, Verbandsklage und Prozessrechtsdogmatik-Neuere
Entwicklungen in einer schwierigen Beziehung, 113 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZESS [ZZP]

399, 399 (2000).
29

See, e.g., id. at 412.

30 Cf John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REv.
823, 852 (1985) (noting that in Germany, administrative law courts as well as other
specialized courts "siphon off business that Americans would expect to see in the ordinary
courts").

31See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions in der Schweiz?, in AUF DEM WEG ZU

EINEM EINHEITLICHEN VERFAHREN 111, 119-20 (Benjamin Schindler & Regula Schlauri eds.,

2001) [hereinafter Baumgartner, Class Actions]. In the United States, the term "public law
litigation" has been well known at least since the late Professor Chayes drew attention to it in
1976. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281 (1976). The difference to Switzerland is that such litigation for the most part is not
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example, would fall into this category. For these reasons, it is important to
point out that the federal government has had the power to regulate
administrative procedure and the organization of the administrative
judiciary to adjudicate cases involving federal administrative law for quite
some time. 32 Naturally, as far as state administrative law is concerned, state
procedural law prevails. 33 Thus, in Switzerland, the separation between
public and private law is not only important for purposes of identifying the
competent court (civil or administrative), but it also determines the extent
of federal power vis-A-vis the states.
III. EXISTING GROUP ACTION DEVICES AND PLANNED REFORMS
A. Class Actions
For decades, class action litigation was exclusively a phenomenon of
the United States. Although there have increasingly been suggestions to
introduce class actions-at least in limited circumstances-in many other
countries, few of those countries have yet acted on them.34 Among those35
that have, most are squarely in the common law tradition (Australia,
England, 36 and several Canadian provinces other than Quebec 37), and a few
(Quebec 38 and Sweden 39) have a close connection to common law
conducted in distinct public law courts in the United States. Moreover, at least Professor
Chayes cast his net wider by including in his definition of public law litigation suits brought
by private individuals against other private groups and individuals. See id. at 1284.
32See Constitution of 1874, May 29, 1874, AS 1 (1875), as amended on Oct. 25, 1914,
art. 103 (Switz.); Constitution of 1874, May 29, 1874, AS 1 (1875), as amended on Feb. 20,
1938, art. 114 (Switz.).
33 To complicate matters, the implementation of a considerable number of substantive
federal administrative statutes has been delegated to the cantons. In such instances,
adjudication has long been by cantonal authorities and administrative courts, but usually
with an opportunity for judicial review by a federal administrative tribunal. See, e.g., GYGI,
supra note 27, at 25-27. The planned reorganization of the federal judiciary is unlikely to
change this general approach. For details see, e.g., Christoph Auer, Auswirkungen der
Reorganisation der

Bundesrechtspflege auf die

Kantone,

ZENTRALBLATr FOR STAATSUND VERWALTUNGSRECHT [ZBL]
34 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 3, at 158-59.

107

SCHWEIZERISCHES

121 (2006).

35 Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act, 1991, no. 181, § 3; Supreme Court Rules,
1999, am. 11 Vict., c. I (Austl.). See also S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff
Litigation in Australia: A Comparative Perspective, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289
(2001).
36 CPR 19.6 (1998) (U.K.).
37 British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, S.B.C., ch. 21 (1995); Ontario Class
Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992); Saskatchewan Class Proceedings Act, S.S., ch. C-12-01
(2002). For commentary, see, e.g., MICHAEL EIZENGA ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS LAW AND
PRACTICE (1999); WARD K. BRANCH, CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA (1996).

38Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. C 25, §§ 99-1052 (1978).
39 Group Proceedings Act (Svensk forfattningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) (Swed.).
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procedure, with Brazil as the big exception. 40 Among the remaining
countries, some have seen class action proposals move to a rather advanced
stage in the legislative process,4' while in others, such proposals have never
quite taken off. Switzerland belongs to the latter category. A number of
Swiss academics have argued that the country could learn from U.S. class
action practice to adopt more adequate procedural rules for mass tort
cases.4 z Moreover, thirty Members of Parliament requested in 1998 that the
Federal Council, the Swiss executive, consider the adoption of class actions
for labor, landlord-tenant, and consumer law disputes.4 3 Neither of these
proposals went very far, however.
In 1988, a large volume of water contaminated with agricultural
chemicals was washed from a Sandoz plant in Schweizerhalle near Basel
into the Rhine River, severely contaminating the river water downstreamthe "Schweizerhalle accident." In the wake of that accident, the Justice
Department appointed a group of experts to study a possible reform of
federal tort law. 4 The group was given the specific task, among others, to

40

See, e.g., Gidi, supra note 1, at 312-13.

41 See, e.g., Guillaume Cerutti & Marc Guillaume Rapport sur l'action de groupe, Dec.

16, 2005, available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/054004458/
0000.pdf (France). However, the French proposal has been watered down considerably in the
legislative process. See, e.g., Marc Rees, France: La loi sur 1 'action de groupe avance ...
doucement, PClnpact.com, at http://akosh.pcinpact.com/actu/news/32625-action-collectivegratuite.htm.
42 See, e.g., ISABELLE RoMY, LITIGES DE MASSE 235-20 (1997); Emil W. Stark & Stefan

Knecht, Einfuhrung einer Zwangsgemeinschaftffr Geschcidigte bei Massenschiden?, 97
ZSR 1I 51 (1978); Pierre Tercier, L'indemnisation des prejudices causes par des
catastrophesen droit suisse, 109 ZSR 11497 (1990).
43 Motion 98.3401, Jutzet Erwin, Einfifhrung der Sammelklage im Arbeits-, Miet- und
Konsumentenrecht; Baumgartner, Class Actions, supra note 31, at 112. Unlike in the United
States, most bills in Switzerland-as in many other civil law countries-are drafted by the
executive. While legislators have few staffers, if any, available to them, the executive, in
particular the Justice Department, employs a significant number of capable lawyers, many of
them with academic ambitions or already in academia, whose main job is legislative
drafting. For larger projects, putting together the first draft is usually a task assigned to an
ad-hoc committee of experts, composed of leading academics and practicing lawyers in the
area of concern. See Bundesgesetz Ober die Bundesversammlung Dec. 13, 2002, SR 171.10,
art. 141 (Switz.); Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisationsgesetz Mar. 21, 1997, SR
172.010, art. 7 (Switz.); Walter Buser, Das Vorverfahren der Gesetzgebung, 85
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZENTRALBLATT FOR STAATS- UND VERWALTUNGSRECHT 145 (1984).

44 See Pierre
Haftpflichtrechts,

Widmer & Pierre Wesner,
Erlauternder
Bericht

Revision
15-17

und Vereinheitlichung
(1999),
available

des
at

http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/haftpflich.Par.0002.File.t
mp/vn-ber-d.pdf. The water was used to fight a fire that had broken out after an explosion at
the plant. That explosion brought back memories of the deadly explosion of a chemical plant
in Bhopal, India, in 1984 and made many Swiss fear that in a future accident of this kind, the
effect might be much worse.
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evaluate the necessity of distinct procedural rules for mass tort cases.45 In
its final report, the group suggested the introduction of various possible
forms of group litigation in mass tort cases and recommended drafting a
separate law on catastrophe litigation, such as Schweizerhalle, which it
distinguished from mass torts.4 ° The first tort reform draft of 1999,
however, failed to follow up on any of these proposals, and, as part of rather
severe budgetary measures, the Federal Council decided in 2003 to drop the
entire tort reform project from its legislative agenda.4 7
The proposal to consider the introduction of class actions for labor,
landlord-tenant, and consumer disputes 48 was passed on to the committee of
experts drafting the new Federal Code of Civil Procedure.4 9 Without much
research, however, the committee decided to refrain from introducing a
U.S.-style class-action into its draft code, noting that such a device is
foreign to Swiss traditions. 50 This decision has largely been greeted with
satisfaction by lawyers, academics, and political groups.5" The subsequent
draft submitted by the executive to parliament thus remains firmly opposed
to the introduction of a class action device.5 2 Hence, it is unlikely that the
American-style class action will make an appearance in Swiss53 law,
including in the new Federal Code of Civil Procedure, any time soon.
Why this reluctance?
As in many other jurisdictions that have
contemplated the adoption of a class-action device,54 proponents of such a
device in Switzerland face considerable doctrinal, jurisprudential, cultural,
and economic objections. Among them are a traditional focus on the
individual nature of a claim; 55 limitation of judicial power vis-a-vis the
45 See id. at 17.
46

Bericht der Studienkommission fir die Gesamtrevision des Haftpflichtrechts 190-95

(1991) (copy on file with the author).
47 See Bundesamt fLir Justiz, Haftpflichtrecht:
Was ist bisher geschehen?,
http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/themen/wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/haftplicht.html
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2006). On the role of the executive in the legislative process, see discussion
supra note 43.
48 See supra text accompanying note 43.
49 Motion 98.3401, Jutzet Erwin, Stellungnahme des Bundesrates (on file with author).
so See Begleitbericht, supra note 20, at 15, 45-46.
51 See Vemehmlassungsbericht, supra note 21, at 96-98. The only critical voice directed
against that decision came from the University of Geneva. See id.
52 Botschaf, supra note 22, at 7224.
53 But see infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
54 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 3, at 159-60.

55Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 1, at 269-70; Greger, supra note 28, at 399; see also
infra text accompanying notes 129-40. While civil procedure is conceptually limited to
individual claims, enforcing the public interest is primarily considered a matter of the
criminal process. See, e.g., Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 1, at 269-70. Thus, the victims
of alleged criminal behavior, as private attorneys general, are allowed in several Swiss
cantons, as well as in some other civil law jurisdictions, to force a criminal prosecution
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legislature, 56 thus disallowing the large-scale judicial discretion necessary to
manage complex litigation; strong emphasis on the litigants' right to be
heard, which would need to be slighted in complex cases;5 8 different
respective roles of judges and attorneys;59 lack of American-style fee
structures and entrepreneurial lawyering; 60 and the many practical changes
that would be necessary to introduce a class action device. Moreover, there
is a clear preference for legislation rather than litigation to deal with new
social problems, including mass torts. 6 1 This preference is perhaps more
realistic in a country in which legislators still spend most of their time
legislating (rather than running for re-election) and are not usually afraid of
taking a clearly defined position on the issues of the day.62 Moreover, the
where the public prosecutor fails to bring one and to appeal an acquittal, among other things.
See, e.g., Felix Bommer, Warum sollen sich Verletzte am Strafverfahren beteiligen duirfen?,
121 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 172 (2003); Beth van Schaack, In
Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement ofHuman Rights Norms in the Context
of the ProposedHague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 145-46 (2001).
56 The main concern is to cabin judicial power in countries in which the judiciary has
historically been part of governmental repression rather than representing a bulwark against
it. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: TRANSATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION
85-86 (2003) [hereinafter BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE CONVENTION]; see also infra text

accompanying notes 129-40.
57 See, e.g., Douglas L. Parker, Standing to Litigate "Abstract Social Interests" in the
United States and Italy: Reexamining "Injury in Fact", 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259,
300-06 (1995).
58See, e.g., Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 1, at 219.
59 See, e.g., David J. Gerber, ExtraterritorialDiscovery and the Conflict of Procedural
Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COM. L. 745, 752-55 (1986).
60 See, e.g., Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation under E. U. and German Law, 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 355, 365 (2001); Harald Koch, Die Verbandsklage in Europa, 113
ZZP 413, 426-27 (2000).
61 See, e.g., Burkhard Hep3, Entschddigungfur NS-Zwangsarbeit vor US-amerikanischen
und deutschen Zivilgerichten, 44 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 145, 152 (1999); Walter,
supra note 12, at 376.
62 The federal legislation attempting to tackle new social problems is considerable. Its
proliferation is particularly notable in the area of consumer protection. To take one example,
frequent reports of travel arrangements turning sour without the customers of the organizers
receiving adequate compensation from either the organizer or their travel agency led the
Swiss Parliament to adopt the Federal Act on Organized Travel. See Bundesgesetz tiber die
Pauschalreisen, June 18, 1993, SR 944.3 (Switz.). Among many other provisions, the Act
contains stiff liability provisions. See id. arts. 14-16. Further, travel organizers and travel
agents must keep a guaranty fund large enough to guarantee the payment of any damages to
any and all customers. See id. art. 18. However, such provisions are not foolproof as the
recent bankruptcy of a Zurich area travel organizer showed: The organizer had bilked the
guaranty fund in order to stay afloat. The ombudsman of the travel industry then got the
insured's travel insurance to offer customers of the bankrupt a 27% cash payment plus 13%
in travel coupons of prepayed travel money in exchange for an undertaking not to sue. See,
e.g., Doris Huber, Jann Konkurs: Das ASTAG Angebot gilt his 31. 8. 05,
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legislative process is considered to derive particular legitimacy from the
presence of direct-democratic mechanisms, such as the referendum 63 and
the initiative.64 Finally, given these and other differences, the question of
cannot easily be
how much of a need there really is for class actions
65
answered in the same fashion as in the United States.
The report of the committee of experts mentions some of these issues.
It points out that, in the Swiss procedural tradition, the right to conduct a
proceeding is closely connected to one's claimed substantive right.66 And
the committee displays considerable unease with the prospect of judicial
supervision of the litigants' attorneys.67 The report also alludes to the
problem that class litigation may result in a level of complexity that is
difficult, if not impossible, to manage.68 What is missing in the report,
however, is any serious analysis of these issues. Instead, the committee
simply concludes that the traditional Rrocedural vehicles, including suits by
associations, "are by far sufficient." 9 This is unfortunate. Not only do

http://www.beobachter.ch/artikelfree.aspSession=BFF 1C49B-700A-473F-832344EF01 IE
515&AssetlD=8829.

63Every piece of federal legislation is subject to a popular referendum when requested by

a certain number (currently roughly one percent) of the voting-age population or by the
governments of eight cantons within three months of passage by the legislature. If enough
such signatures are gathered, the legislation is adopted when a simple majority of those
voting approve. Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of Apr. 18, 1999, arts. 141(1),
142(2).
64 The constitutional vehicle of the initiative permits a certain number of voters, currently
roughly two percent of the voting-age population, to propose a constitutional amendment,
which must be put to a popular vote. The amendment is adopted when a simple majority of
those voting plus a simple majority of those voting in the majority of cantons approve. Id.
arts. 138-39, 142(2). The Swiss people thus have the opportunity both to vote down
legislation passed by their parliament and to take action when their parliament has failed to
do so. Obviously, gathering the relevant number of signatures among voters, particularly
within the three-month window set for the referendum, is not easy. This is where trade
associations, NGOs, and small political parties can exercise some leverage.
65 See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative
Perspective, 2 INT'L L. F. 254, 255-57 (2000) [hereinafter Baumgartner, Group Litigation]
(conference review essay).
66 See Begleitbericht, supra note 20, at 15.
67 See id. at 46.
68 See id.
A critical question for research is whether [the] potential [of the judicial system] is
or can be exploited to produce a party structure that is adequately representative in
light of the consequences of public law litigation without introducing so much
complexity that the procedure falls of its own weight.
Chayes, supra note 31, at 1312.
69 See Begleitbericht, supra note 20, at 45-46.
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good arguments exist to address most of these concerns, 70 but there is also
the powerful argument that, as we have moved from an individualistic to an
industrial society, civil procedure needs to provide class proceedings as
well as individual litigation for the effective and efficient enforcement of
laws and individual rights. 7 1 To be sure, good arguments can be made
against the introduction of a class action device in Switzerland or at least
for its limitation to certain issue areas.72 But given the importance of the
new Swiss procedural code for the enforcement of substantive law and
individual rights, access to justice, efficiency, equality, and fairness-the
process values usually stated at the beginning of civil procedure textbooks
in Switzerland 73 --one would have expected more careful analysis.
Apparently, there are other reasons for such cavalier treatment. First,
as the report of the committee mentions, its members wanted to avoid, as
much as possible, importing any new procedural devices from abroad.74 In
the committee's view, merging twenty-six different state procedural codes
into one consistent Federal Code was difficult enough. 75 Given that some
have fought for this new Federal Code for decades, however, one would
have expected a more visionary 77approach, including some in-depth
(international) comparative analysis. This is particularly true because the
70 See, e.g., Baumgartner, ClassActions, supra note 31, at 119-28; Gidi, supra note 1, at
321-23, 344-54, 363-72; Per Henrik Lindblom, Group Actions: A Study of the AngloAmerican Class Action Suit From a Swedish Perspective, in GROUP ACTIONS AND CONSUMER

PROTECTION 7 (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992); infra text accompanying notes 141-52.
71 See, e.g., Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 1, at 219-21; Rowe, supra note 3, at 157-58.
72 See, e.g., Baumgartner, ClassActions, supra note 31, at 122-28.
71 See,

e.g.,

WALTHER

J.

HABSCHEID,

SCHWEIZERISCHES

ZIVILPROZESS-

UND

1-3 (2d ed. 1990); MAX KUMMER, GRUNDRISS DES
ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 3-7, 13-14 (4th ed. 1984); VOGEL, ET AL., supranote 24, at 36-40. See
generally, ROBERT COVER & OWEN Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979) (offering a
GERICHTSORGANISATIONSRECHT

valuable collection of readings on process values in the United States). Oddly, the
commentary accompanying the latest proposal of the new federal code discusses the tension
among these process values without taking a position on how best to resolve them. Instead it
simply concludes with the catchy slogan: "The new Code of Civil Procedure: Familiar,
Innovative, and Ready for the Future" (vertraut, innovativ undzukunftsgerichtet). Botschaft,

supra note 22, at 7233.
74 See Begleitbericht, supra note 20, at 15.
75 id.
76 See generally THOMAS

SUTTER-SOMM,

AUF

DEM WEG

ZUR

RECHTSEINHEIT IM

SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (1998) (expounding efforts to unify civil procedure

in Switzerland since 1872).
77 Apparently the Swiss Executive recognized this and has abandoned this rhetoric. Now
the draft claims to be at the cutting edge of international developments by introducing
enforceable notary documents from the Romanist and Latin countries and by putting a
stronger emphasis on mediation. Botschaft, supra note 22, at 7223-24. That change in
rhetoric has not, however, been accompanied by better comparative analysis with regard to
group and class action litigation. The "comparative" analysis in the latest draft is even
shorter and relies primarily on an article in the Financial Times, describing the perceived
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European Community, whose member states surround Switzerland, has
been on a course of harmonizing various aspects of procedure, including to
some extent in the area of group litigation. 8 In the committee's defense,
one does need to point out that avoiding anything controversial is a triedand-true approach within the Swiss political system of consensus
democracy.
Second, the committee report mentions the perceived danger that
"baseless claims would be filed for the sole reason of forcing the defendant
into a settlement. ' ' 80 In Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe, this is an
often-heard complaint about U.S. class action proceedings, indeed about
U.S. litigation in general.8 1 It reveals a deeper reason for opposing the
adoption of class actions in Switzerland and elsewhere: outright rejection of
U.S.-style litigation.82 At the heart of this rejection, as the committee's
concern about strike suits shows, is a deep unease with 84the way in which the
anti-formalism, 85
jury trial, 83 a procedure steeped in equity,
pathologies of American class action litigation, to prove the lack of need for the device.
Botschaft, supra note 22, at 7290.
78 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Class Actions, supra note 31, at 112-13; Burkhard He3, Neue
Rechtsetzungsakte und Rechtsetzungsmethoden im europdischen Justizraum, 124 ZSR II,
183 (2005).
79 See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND

PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-six COuNTRIES 31-41 (1999); STEINER, supra note 16. Lijphart

uses ten elements to distinguish a consensus democracy from a majoritarian democracy:
executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets; executive-legislative balance of power;
multiparty system; proportional representation; interest group corporatism; federal and
decentralized government; strong bicameralism; constitutional rigidity; judicial review; and
central bank independence. Switzerland meets all of these except the requirement of judicial
review: the Supreme Court may not review the constitutionality of federal legislation.
80 Begleitbericht, supra note 20, at 46.
81See, e.g., Burkhard Hep, Die Anerkennung eines Class Action Settlement in
Deutschland, 55 JURISTENZEITUNG 373, 374 (2000); Heinrich Honsell, Amerikanische
Rechtskultur, in DER EINFLUSS DES EUROPAISCHEN RECHTS AUF DIE SCHWEIZ 39, 48 (Peter

Forstmoser et al. eds., 1999); Regina Kiener & Raphael Lanz, Amerikanisierung des
Schweizerischen Rechts-und ihre Grenzen, 119 ZSR 155, 155 (2000).
82 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 3,at 159 (noting that "[t]he perceived extremes to which
Americans have taken things... can turn off those in whose traditions such practices are
anathema.").
83 See, e.g., Felix Dasser, Punitive Damages: Vom 'fremden Fdtzel" zum
"Miteidgenoss"?, 96 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG [SJZ] 101, 102-03 (2000)
(speaking of the aleatoric character of U.S. jury decisions).
841 am referring here to "the enormous flexibility and latitude of U.S. procedureincluding its ability to create new remedies, judicial discretion, liberal pleading, the
availability of the class-action device, and the ability of the parties to join every conceivable
claim" as well as to discovery. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation
in United States Courts: The Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 841 (2002)
[hereinafter Baumgartner, Human Rights]. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 909 (1987).

Class Actions in Switzerland

27:301 (2007)
87

86

entrepreneurial lawyering,86 the prospect of punitive damages, and the
tendency toward the lawsuit as a business deal that these features support,88
results in a litigation system in the United States in which power (including
judicial power), money (who has it and who does not), and tactics seem to
be more important in the outcome of litigation than a finding of who is right
and who is wrong. 89 This unease was underscored in the 1980s and early
1990s, when what the Germans call the "judicial conflict" with the United
States resulted in extensive depictions in German law journals of the U.S.
litigation system as arbitrary and unfair-interestingly, unfair primarily to
defendants, but that should not be surprising given the reports' provenance
in the U.S. tort reform movement.9 ° This German scholarship seems to
have influenced the thinking of Swiss scholars, especially in Germanspeaking Switzerland. 9' The perception that U.S. courts were exercising
their country's hegemonic power in dealing with foreign parties and foreign
sovereignty concerns further supported the unease. 92
In the late 1990s, objection to U.S.-style class actions was further
intensified in Switzerland by the Holocaust Assets Litigation, in which
several classes of Holocaust survivors sued the major Swiss banks for
conversion of their families' bank accounts during and after World War II
and for other misdeeds.93 Although the cases presented a number of
difficult legal and factual questions, from the procedural (personal
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, proof of title) to the substantive
(applicable law, statute of limitations, preemption by treaty), they were
settled, after eighteen months, for $1.25 billion without a single legal ruling
by the trial judge.94 This seemed to confirm that power is more important
85 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Human Rights, supra note 84, at 843. See generally NEIL
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

32-299 (1995) (expounding American

anti-formalism).
86 See, e.g., Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 1, at 220; Heo, supra note 61, at 145.
87 See, e.g., Honsell, supra note 81, at 45-48.
88See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000); Judith Resnik,
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593 (2005); William B. Rubenstein, A
TransactionalModel ofAdjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001).

89 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Human Rights, supra note 84, at 843-46; Hep3, supra note 61,
at 145, 149-50.
90 See Baumgartner, TransnationalLitigation, supra note 9, at 1340-41.
91

See, e.g., Honsell, supra note 81, at 45-52 (presenting a very one-sided narrative of

U.S. tort law and procedure).

See, e.g., Baumgartner, TransnationalLitigation,supra note 9, at 1352-53.
93 See generally, Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era
92

Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002) (an account of that litigation by
one of its protagonists).
94 See, e.g., id. at 805-12 (describing filing, settlement negotiations, and settlement in
that litigation).
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than the merits in resolving class actions in the United States. 95 For the
Swiss public and those involved in procedural reform, it did not matter that
the most important power play in that dispute took place outside of the
courtroom by various U.S. government officials, 96 the chairman of the
and the legislatures of New York and
Senate Banking Committee,
California. 98 Together with the unease about the U.S. litigation system
described above, this power play reinforced the impression "that what
matters for the outcome is not the rule of law, but the relative power of the
litigants and of the governments that they are able to mobilize." 99 The
resulting suspicion of American procedure and American law seems to
suffice for most Swiss reformers today to dismiss the viability of the class
action out of hand when they could take the device and its application in the
United States as the basis for a deeper reflection on process values in
Switzerland and how well those values are served by the existing system.
B. Association Suits (Verbandsklagen)
1. GeneralRequirements and Standing to Sue
Just because there is no class action device does not mean, however,
that there is no procedural vehicle to allow for group litigation in
Switzerland. As in the United States, less far-reaching devices already
exist. Probably the best known such device is the association suit
(Verbandsklage in German). As in Germany, 100 the Swiss legislature first
introduced the Verbandsklage in the area of unfair competition, granting
associations that are authorized by their bylaws to pursue the economic
95 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Human Rights, supra note

84, at 847 (noting that "when the
$1.25 billion settlement became public, a great number of editorialists, members of
Parliament, and other protagonists of public opinion berated the Swiss banks for selling out
to the 'blackmail' from overseas."). That the defendants did not even raise some of these
issues, from what I understand partly to avoid extensive discovery and the testing of the trial
judge's patience, only supported this perception.
96 See, e.g., STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE, LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR AND

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR 11 (2003) (providing account of government and
other negotiations by probably the most important protagonists of the U.S. government in

this saga); Neuborne, supra note 93, at 797 (describing diplomacy as the second leg of the
litigation).

97 See, e.g., Profanierung des Holocaust im Wahlkampf Kritik an den populistischen
Strategien Senator D 'Amatos, NZZ, Oct. 29, 1998.
98 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, New York Officials to Impose Sanctions on Swiss Banks
Sept. 1, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at A3; David Cay Johnston, Two States Outline Sanctions
on Swiss Banks in Holocaust Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at A5. See generally,
EIZENSTAT, supra note 96, at 339-56 (demonstrating the importance of all these levels of
government involvement for the outcome of the Holocaust litigation).
99 Baumgartner, Human Rights, supra note 84, at 845.
100 See Gesetz zur Bekdmpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, May 27, 1896, § 1 (F.R.G.).

Class Actions in Switzerland
27:301 (2007)
interests of their members to bring claims of violations of the Unfair
Competition Act on behalf of those members.' 0 1 However, associations are
limited to 10claiming
declaratory relief and injunctions to stop the alleged
2
violations.
While the Unfair Competition Act was being drafted, the Federal
Supreme Court recognized a similar right of trade associations to seek a
judgment declaring a registered patent invalid if that is in the economic
interest of the association's members. 10 3 A few years later, in a 1947 case,
the Court extended the area of application of that decision as a matter of
federal common law. In that case, the Court allowed the Swiss Association
of Barbershop Employees to challenge a provision in the bylaws of the
Basel Association of Barber Masters to refrain from hiring a barber who
had worked with an Association member within 500 meters of the new
employment site for six months. 10 4 Although every barber in the city of
Basel was potentially affected and thus had standing to sue, the Court
reasoned, few would do so as long as they stayed with the same
employer. 10 5 That was so, the Court said, because of the financial risk of
litigation and because of the danger for the claimant to be singled out and
never to be hired by a Basel barber again.10 6 It thus held that an association
can bring suit on behalf of its members if[1] the association's claim pursues an interest of all those among
whose numbers the association recruits its members;
[2] the association is authorized, by its bylaws, to pursue the
economic interests of its members; and
[3] all of the association's members would themselves
10 7 have standing
to sue (i.e. they are the holders of the claimed right).
The Court held that this right of the association to sue arises out of
Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code, which allows everyone "whose person
is being harmed unlawfully" to sue "anyone who participates in the harmful
act." : As a result, the common law Verbandsklage is limited to claims of
101See Bundesgesetz fiber den unlauteren Wettbewerb Sept. 30, 1943, art. 2(3) (Switz.),

superseded by Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb Dec. 19, 1986, SR 241, art.
10(2)(b) (Switz.) [hereinafter Unfair Competition Act].
102Id.

103Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Feb. 27, 1940, 66 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] II 62 (Switz.).
104Federal Court May 20, 1947, 73 BGE II 65 (Switz.).
05 Id. at 72.

106

Id.

107Id. at 69-72.
108 Schweizerisches

Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 28
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harm to one's person. At first, it looked like there was a further limitation
to the area of labor law since the Court based its decision in doctrinal terms
on the strong representative role that substantive federal labor law had
assigned to labor associations (both unions and trade associations) in
disposing over its members' Ipersonal rights. 10 9 But later decisions made
clear that such is not the case.
The limitation of the association suit to claims of harm to one's person
is not as narrow an area of application as it may at first seem. Article 28
protects against any unlawfulP interference with the integrity of one's
personhood, from physical and psychological harm to one's body to
limitations on one's freedom to do what one wants-including the freedom
to exploit one's abilities economically-to interference with one's
11 3
privacy1 2 and defamatory statements and other slights of one's honor.
Nevertheless, it is a limitation that is significant, excluding association suits
in both contract cases and the majority of negligent tort actions, namely
those in which the alleged negligent act was not per se unlawful. 114
Thirteen years later, the Court had an opportunity to revisit the
association suit in another labor dispute. 15 This time, a Geneva trade
association had entered into a labor contract with a national trade union on
the conditions of employment of electricians." 6 Among the contract's
provisions was a requirement that the fund of the Geneva trade association
(Switz.).

109 Federal Court 73 BGE II 65, at 70.
110 Federal Court Sept. 27, 1977, 103 BGE 1I 294, 302 (Switz.) ("That these decisions

concerned labor matters does not change their fundamental importance.").
111Civil Code, Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art 28(1) ("The infringement is unlawful if it is
not justified by the consent of the harmed, by a prevailing public or private interest, or by
statute.").
112 See generally, James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (analyzing the very different views on, and legal

protections of, privacy in Europe and the United States, respectively).
113 See, e.g., HEINZ HAUSHEER & REGINA AEBI-MULLER,

DAS PERSONENRECHT DES

SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILGESETZBUCHES 12.70 (2005). See generally, Whitman, supra note

112, at 1180-88 (exploring the historical and philosophical development of the law of
protecting the person in the German Civil Code, much of which influenced art. 28 of the
Swiss Civil Code).
114 See, e.g.,

THOMAS

ROTHLISBERGER,

ZIVILRECHTLICHE

PRODUKTBEOBACHTUNGS-,

WARN- UND ROCKRUFPFLICHTEN DER HERSTELLER 187 (2003) (noting that association suits

will hardly ever be permissible in product liability cases for lack of violation of the personal
rights of all members of an association).
15 Federal Court Jan. 19, 1960, 86 BGE 11 18 (Switz.).
116 In Switzerland, as in many other continental European countries, labor contracts are
negotiated and entered into between unions and trade associations, the latter negotiating in
the name of all member employers, rather than between unions and individual companies as
is usually the case in the United States. See, e.g., MANFRED REHBINDER, SCHWEIZERISCHES
ARBEITSRECHT 143-48 (9th ed. 1988).
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pay employed electricians 100% of their salary during national holidays,
when the electrical shops would be closed. 1 7 A local Geneva trade union
approached the Geneva trade association with a request for a contract with
the same conditions.1 8 The trade association refused, having been told by
the national trade union that it would otherwise withdraw from its contract.
In the meantime, the local trade union paid its members the holiday salary
that they were not receiving due to the strong-arming of the national
union.1 9 The local union then sued both the national union and the Geneva
trade association, seeking a repayment of the holiday salaries.120 The
plaintiffs primary argument was that it was suing in the name of its
members, whose holiday pay it had merely advanced. The Supreme Court,
however, held that the plaintiff did not have standing. The Court held that
while the three requirements set up by the Court in its 1947 decision were
met, associations were limited to claiming declaratory relief and an order to
cease violating the defendants' Article 28 rights. Claims for damages,
however, would have to be brought by the individual members of the
association. 121
This is so, the Court reasoned, because the right to bring a claim for
damages is a personal right of the creditor, which only he can assert in
court.
Allowing an association to claim that right in court, possibly
against the creditor's will, would violate his right to dispose of his personal
claims.12 3 That, the Court opined, would amount to a transfer of the
creditor's right against his will. 124 Moreover, the Court continued, the
association in a Verbandsklage always pursues a right that is distinct from
the rights of its individual members, one that is grounded in the common
interest of the members and others equally situated. 25 Thus, to the extent
that an association pursues such a common interest-such as the interest of
all Geneva electricians to have both the labor and management defendant
stop interfering with their right to contract-it can do so without interfering

117

Federal Court 86 BGE 1118, at 19-20.

"' Id. at 20.
119 Id.
120

id.

121

ld. at 21-27 (The plaintiff nevertheless won in the Supreme Court on its alternative

theory that it had given its members the holiday pay in negotiorum gestio, which it could
claim as its own right against the defendants.). See generally, John P. Dawson, Negotiorum
Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1961); Duncan Sheehan,
Negotiorum Gestio: A Civilian Concept in the Common Law?, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 253
(2006) (explaining negotiorumgestio).

122 Federal Court 86 BGE 11 18, at 22.
123 id.
124

id.

125 Id.
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with the individual rights of its members. 126 But to the extent it intends to
advance the rights of individual electricians to receive damages, it is
precluded from doing so. 12 7 Moreover, the Court said that not all of the
Geneva electricians had such a claim to make, because some of them were
represented by the national trade union and thus
128already were parties to the
contract that gives them holiday compensation.
To understand the Court's reasoning, it is important to remember the
strong foundation of 19th Century German Pandectism, 129 which to some
131
130
extent has influenced Swiss civil law, in Kantian concepts of free will
as well as Pandectism's concern with cabining judicial power. 3 2 In this
view, legal rights allow each individual to exercise his free will and thus
"fully to realize his potential as an individual: to give full expression to his
126

Id

127

Id.

128

id.

129 Pandectism was the jurisprudential school that, beginning in the 1840s, continued
Friedrich Carl von Savigny's work of painstakingly organizing Roman law, mainly
Justinian's Digest, scientifically penetrating it so as to achieve a highly formalist hierarchical
system, within which every legal concept has a clearly defined meaning. The effort was
carried by a variety of underlying purposes, among them a positivist-inspired endeavor to
prove law a science independent of the other social sciences and an attempt to constrain
judges in applying the law by a conceptual edifice that would impose one correct
interpretation of the law to be deduced by knowledge of the precise meaning of the concepts
used by the legislature. See, e.g., FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT
430-68 (2d ed. 1967); Gerhard Dilcher, Der rechtswissenschaftliche Positivismus, 61
While Pandectism's strict
ARCHIV FUR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHLOSOPHIE 497 (1975).
formalism was unable to survive later criticism, it has nonetheless left a lasting mark on the
method of making and applying law in Germany and in other civil law countries. It has had a
particularly strong influence on the law of procedure in the German-speaking countries of
See, e.g., FRIDOLIN M.R. WALTHER, DIE AUSLEGUNG DES
continental Europe.
SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, INSBESONDERE DES BUNDESGESETZES UBER DEN
GERICHTSSTAND IN ZIVILSACHEN (GERICHTSSTANDSGESETZ) 79 (2002); Peter Gottwald,
Argumentation im Zivilprozefirecht, 93 ZZP 1, 4-8 (1980).
130 1 say "to some extent" because most cantons and localities in Switzerland resisted
See, e.g., EUGEN HUBER, SYSTEM UND
German-style fill reception of Roman law.
Similarly, the
GESCHICHTE DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS, IV 114-21 (1893).
drafters of the cantonal civil codes and, later, of the Swiss Civil Code, attempted to stay clear
of some of Pandectism's conceptualist language in favor of a style that was easier for the
then-numerous lay judges to understand. Yet, the German Historical School and Pandectism
clearly influenced the drafters of the Civil Code and Code of Obligations as well as later
scholarly and judicial interpretations of those codes. See, e.g., WIEACKER, supra note 129, at
443; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Rezeption deutschen Rechtsdenkens im schweizerischen
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG
UND
in
SCHULDRECHT,
Obligationenrecht,
RECHTSVEREINHEITLICHUNG AN DER SCHWELLE ZUM 21. JAHRHUNDERT 80 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer ed., 1999).
131See, e.g., William B. Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence(I): What Was It Like to Try
a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1997-2004, 2074 (1995).
132 See discussion supra note 129.
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peculiar capacities and powers."' 33 The exercise of those legal rights must
be in the control of the individual and can be limited only by the
legislature. 134 Conversely, no individual can be forced to exercise his rights
or to exercise them at a particular time.135 The procedural equivalent to this
concept is what in German is called Dispositionsmaxime (roughly
"principle of free disposition"): 136 every individual claiming a particular
right must have full control of the decision whether, when, and to what
extent 37 to claim that right in court and if so, whether to prosecute the
claim all the way to trial, agree to a settlement, or abandon prosecution
altogether. 38 This principle fits nicely with the classical liberal concepts
underlying the procedural codes of German-speaking Europe: the judge
should exercise his power-state power--only to the extent that the parties
so request. 39 All this should be easy to understand, although it may be
difficult to believe for those who have been subjected to careless talk about
the "inquisitorial" nature of civil litigation in40civil law countries and the
resulting assumption of an all-powerful judge. 1

133

Whitman, supra note 112, at 1181. The Pandectists thus defined a right as

Willensherrschaft, see, e.g., ANDREAS VON TUHR, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN
BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 1 56-58 (1910), thus assigning "the individual will an area in which
it can control independently of any other will." FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES
HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 1 333 (1840). See generally, Ewald, supra note 13 1, at 2065-

74 (explaining the philosophical history of this concept of right and the formal equality it
was to serve in a hitherto aristocratic German society).
134 See generally, WIEACKER, supra note 129, at 465 (explaining the significance of the
French Revolution's postulates on this concern about limiting the power of judges in
German-speaking Europe).
135 In fact, as von Tuhr points out, assigning individuals the right to exercise their will
means giving them the power to exercise or not to exercise that will any time they wish. See
VON TUHR, supra note 133, at 57.
136See, e.g., KtUMMER, supra note 73, at 80-81.
137 Thus, ne eat iudex ultra petita partium (the judge may not award more or something
different than asked for by the parties). Id. at 81.
138Id.

139See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Der Zivilprozefl als Mittel der Wirtschafts- und
Sozialpolitik, 102 ZSR 161, 162-66 (1983); Gerber, supra note 59, at 769. Cf ADOLF
WACH, VORTRAGE OBER DIE REICHS-CIvILPROCESSORDNUJNG 2 (1896) (referring to the "lack
of interest of the state and its organ, the judge, in the litigation"). This includes imposing the
limitation that only evidence that is likely to be of probative value may be gathered so as to
protect individuals, including the parties, from unnecessary intrusion into their
constitutionally protected privacy by the state (via the judge). See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER,
HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 56, at 84-85; Gerber, supra note 59, at 763 ("Mere
speculation of a party that a witness may say something relevant to the litigation process is
not enough to trigger the use of state power.").
140"Whoever first characterized the continental European system as 'inquisitorial' did a
profound disservice to constructive legal thought." Hearings Before the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, second phase, vol. I, at 205 (1974)
(statement of J. Friendly). A logical corollary to the Dispositionsmaxime flowing from this
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Of course, Pandectist concepts were not the only ones to influence the
Swiss Civil Code and its interpretation.
Germanic communitarian
institutions and ideas also found their way into the Code, 14 1 as did a
somewhat more relaxed attitude toward judicial lawmaking. In particular,
Article 1(2) of the Code provides that if the Code provides no rule for a
particular question of law, "the judge shall... decide according to the rule
that he would promulgate were he a legislator."'' 42 Moreover, Rudolph von
Jhering's ideas about law as legal protection of social interests (and later
about law as a means to achieve social ends) have influenced the Code's
interpretation to some extent, 143 although they have not nearly had the
44
impact that the Legal Realists, who borrowed some of Jhering's ideas,'
had in the United States. 145 Finally, the classical liberal concept of civil
procedure was challenged in the late 19th Century by the Austrian
proceduralist Franz Klein, who argued in favor of a more "social"
procedure, and proved influential in early 20th Century changes to
procedural codes in Switzerland and Germany, as well as Austria.'Y Chief
ideational background is the Verhandlungsmaxime, which holds that the development of the
facts is the responsibility of the parties. Accordingly, only facts alleged by the parties may be
made the basis of the court's judgment; only facts actually in dispute may become the
subject of evidence-gathering; and only evidence proffered by the parties may be gathered
by the court, while proffered evidence must be so gathered unless the judge considers the
proffering party's allegation proven. See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 76-77; Gerber,
supra note 59, at 754. That, together with the limitations of judicial power discussed above,
leaves little of the inquisitorial procedure with which German and other jurisdictions had
experimented in the 18th and earlier centuries. Cf.id. at 768 ("The German system is also
based on the adversarial principle.").
141See, e.g., WIEACKER, supra note 129, at 403-16 (exploring the influence of Germanic
institutions in Germany and Switzerland).
142Article 1 of the Civil Code provides in full:
The Gesetz (legislated law) applies to all questions of law on which it contains a
provision according to its plain language or by interpretation.
If no provision can be gleaned from the Gesetz, the judge shall decide according to
customary law and, where there is no customary law, according to the rule that he
would promulgate were he a legislator.
In doing so, he shall follow well-tried (bewdhrte) scholarship and practice.
e.g. WIEACKER, supra note 129, at 450-53 (portraying Jhering and his
development from a Pandectist to a rebel against Pandectism in the mid- to late 19th
century). As Wieacker points out, Jhering first saw a right as the power of the will
(Willensmacht), as the Pandectists (see supra note 133), but a power bestowed to achieve
protected social interests and later in life went further to see law simply as a means of
exercising power and satisfying interests. WIEACKER, supra note 129, at 451.
144
See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 131, at 2083.
143See,

145See, e.g., Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2005).

146See, e.g., Baudenbacher, supra note 139, at 167-72; Satter, Das Werk Franz Klein's
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among those changes in Switzerland is the federal requirement of judicial
supervision of settlements in specific cases of public interest, mainly those
involving the interest of the child and of the weaker spouse in divorce
proceedings, and a judicial duty to probe whether
the parties really intend
1 47
what they declared in their answer and complaint.
On this basis, then, it is understandable that the Swiss Supreme Court
had no problem utilizing its judicial power pursuant to Article 1(2) of the
Civil Code to extend the Verbandsklage to claims of violations of Article
28 of the Code, finding that Article 28 provided no clear answer as to who
should have the right to sue; 148 using policy arguments to back up its
decision;149 and recognizing an interest of the group as distinct from the
interest of individual members of the association to have the group's rights
enforced by the association. 5 ° Thirteen years later, however, the Court
retreated to the Pandectist concept of personal rights to limit the available
relief.
There is, of course, a difference in these conceptual terms between an
association's claim for declaratory relief and its claim for damages: a
declaratory judgment in favor or against the association would have
conceptually affected the rights of the individual barber employees no less
or no more than a declaration in favor of one of them alone would have
affected the rights of the others. A judgment for damages on behalf of all
members, however, would have adjudicated the individual members'
alleged right to damages once and for all. '5' Yet, it seems odd that the
Supreme Court retreated from its relatively bold use of Article 1(2) and
from its policy argument that association members would not have the
means or the economic power to sue individually, an argument that would
support an association suit for damages as well. Moreover, the slight
52
weakening of the Dispositionsmaxime in more recent procedural reforms
makes one wonder how conceptually unthinkable it really is to transfer the
rights of individual members to sue to an association (or a class
representative for that matter). Apparently the extension of group rights
had gone far enough as a matter of policy, including the Kantian-liberal
ideals underlying Swiss civil law and procedure. Perhaps, the Court was
simply trying to align the outcome with the declared policy of the
legislature in the Unfair Competition Act. 153 Moreover, there are other
und sein Einfluss aufdie neueren Prozessgesetze, 60 ZZP 272 (1937).
See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 81; Gerber, supra note 59, at 754-55.
148 See Federal Court May 20, 1947, 73 BGE II 68-69 (Switz.).
149 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
150 See Federal Court 73 BGE II at 71.
151See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
153 Cf Federal Court Jan. 19, 1960, 86 BGE II 23 (Switz.) (referring approvingly to
147
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reasons against allowing the association to claim damages on behalf of its
members, such as the fact that each member's claim for damages may be
different and a fear of over-deterrence. Accordingly, the Court's limitation
of association suits to declaratory relief and orders to stop violating the
defendants' Article 28 rights has been well received and was quickly
adopted by the federal 54legislature when extending the Verbandsklage to
other substantive areas.
With this limitation on available remedies, the Verbandsklage has
itself been fairly well received by the federal legislature. As a result, the
Verbandsklage is available today in a number of substantive areas in
addition to violations of Article 28 of the Civil Code and unfair competition
as discussed above. In the areas of trademark and unfair competition law,
consumer organizations "of national or regional importance" are given the
right to sue to enforce the relevant statutes to the extent they affect
consumer interests in addition to allowin associations to sue in favor of the
economic interests of their members;'
the Federal Act on the Equal
Treatment of Men and Women allows organizations that have as their
declared aim the achievement of gender equality or the representation of
employee interests to bring claims alleging gender discrimination; 5 6 and
the Federal Act on the Codetermination Rights of Employees gives trade
associations and unions the right to enforce the Act's obligations on behalf
of individual companies and employees in court. 57 As discussed above,
however, the Verbandsklage in all these instances is limited to declaratory
relief and orders to stop unlawful behavior. Moreover, damages and other
injunctive relief can be pursued only by individuals, possibly with the
Article 2(3) of the Unfair Competition Act and its limits on available relief in association
suits as well as to policy arguments made in the legislative process in support of those
limits).
154 See, e.g., FRANK ET AL. KOMMENTAR ZUR ZORCHERISCHEN ZPO 150-51 (3d ed. 1997);
VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 207.

155Bundesgesetz Uiber den Schutz von Marken und Herkunftsangaben Aug. 28, 1992, SR
232.11, art. 56 (Switz.); Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Unfair
Competition Act] Dec. 19, 1986, SR 241, art. 10(2)(b) (Switz.).

To the extent that these

statutes enable consumer organizations to sue, they do so without requiring their members to
have standing individually, indeed without requiring some injury in fact, as modem
American standing doctrine does. Cf Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
(holding that environmental organization lacked standing to file a suit challenging a federal
regulation interpreting the Endangered Species Act's interagency consultation requirement
because the organization was asserting "only a generally available grievance about
government").
156Bundesetz Ober die Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann, Mar. 24, 1995, SR 151.1, art.
7 (Switz.) [hereinafter Gleichstellungsgesetz]. Pursuant to this statute, the association can
sue in its own name, but is required to cooperate closely with the employees involved in the
alleged discrimination. Id.
157Bundesgesetz Ober die Information und Mitsprache der Arbeitnehmerinnen und
Arbeitnehmer in den Betrieben Dec. 17, 1993, SR 822.14, art. 15(2) (Switz.).
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1 58
practical advantage
of a finding of unlawfulness in a preceding
59
suit.1
association

2. Res JudicataEffect
Despite being part of federal civil procedure for some sixty years, the
Verbandsklage has largely been neglected by Swiss proceduralists. In
books and courses on civil procedure, the subject is usually treated as a
brief add-on to discussions on standing and the ability to sue. 6 ° Similarly,
all of the published court decisions deal with the question of whether the
requirements have been met to proceed with a Verbandsklage in the first
place. As a result, the precise res judicata effects of a judgment in an
association suit are somewhat unclear.
In the decision in which it extended the device to the law of
personality in 1947,161 the Swiss Supreme Court briefly addressed the
defendant's argument that letting the association of barber employees
proceed with a Verbandsklage would disadvantage it because a judgment in
the defendant's favor would not bar members of the plaintiff association to
bring individual lawsuits on the same claim later.16 The Court did not
indicate disagreement with the argument's assumption that a judgment in an
association suit, whether in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, would
have no binding effect between the defendant and individual members of
the association. Instead it reasoned that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
declaring the Basel barbers' by-law provision against hiring employees
from colleagues within 500 meters illegal, would result in the
ineffectiveness of that provision and thus make it unnecessary for other
barber employees to sue individually.' 63 Conversely, the Court reasoned, in
case of a judgment in favor of the defendant, individual barber employees
would hardly want to take the risk of trying alone what their association
was unsuccessful with as a group.164
The assumption, then, is that the judgment in a Verbandsklage has res
judicata effect between the suing association and the defendant, but not
between the defendant and individual members of the association. This
seems to be supported by the Supreme Court's insistence that the
association is pursuing a public interest distinct from the individual interests
158 As I note below, the judgment in the association suit does not have res judicata effect
between the defendant and the individual members of the association. See infra text
accompanying notes 160-66.
159 See, e.g., FRANK ET AL., supra note 154, at 151.
160 See, e.g., id. at 150-51; VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 207.

161See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
162 Federal Court May 20, 1947, 73 BGE I1 72-73 (Switz.).
163

Id. at 73.

164 id
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of its members.1 65 However, it could be viewed as conceptually
inconsistent with the notion of a few authors that the association acts on
behalf of its members.1 66 But because neither those authors, nor the courts,
as far as I know, have addressed the issue of res judicata head on, the
assumption underlying the Supreme Court's 1947 case is probably the rule
in Switzerland. As the Court also points out in that decision, however, the
judgment in a Verbandsklage is likely to have binding effects between
defendant and individual members (and between defendant and other
associations) as a practical matter because neither may want to risk new
litigation on the same claim, most likely with the same outcome.
3. PracticalImportance
If the res judicata effects of the Verbandsklage remain somewhat
unclear, assessing the device's practical importance comes close to a
guessing game. The Verbandsklage remains under-researched. Statistical
data on its use are largely unavailable. Because the judicial statistics of the
cantons do not distinguish group claims from other litigation, 167 one
interested in learning more about the practical relevance of the device
would have to engage in costly empirical research in twenty-six cantons.
Short of that, I will rely here on published opinions, largely those of the
Swiss Federal Supreme Court. This is rather risky business, not least
because some cantons rarely publish judicial opinions.' 6 8 At the same time,
however, review by the Swiss Supreme Court is a matter of right rather than
by certiorari,1 69 and the Court claims to publish all decisions of substantial
165

See supra text accompanying note 125.

166 See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 67.

167 See, e.g., Supreme Court of the State of Bern, Switzerland, Verwaltungsbericht des
Obergerichts des Kantons Bern flir 2003, Jan. 15, 2004, available at http://www.jgk.be.ch/
site/ogstatistiken og_03_d.pdf.
168 Cf Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 604
(2004).

Both my own empirical work and that of many others have long ago persuaded me
that the picture of a legal landscape that emerges from published opinions, at
whatever court level, is very probably distorted.... The distortion is likely to be

particularly serious when published appellate decisions are used as a basis for
inference about experience at first instance, and when, therefore an appeal bias is
added to the publication bias.
Id.; Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REv. 71, 116 (2001)
("Today, a scholar who studies only published opinions from the United States Courts of
Appeal does so at his or her peril.").
169 There are a number of requirements for a case to be appealable to the Supreme Court.
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importance, both0 of which should impose some discipline on the opinions
published by it.17
In the Supreme Court, I have found nine opinions involving
association suits between 1947 and 2006 (including the two discussed
above), 17 1 four of them handed down between 1995 and 2000 and none, not
even downloadable unpublished opinions, 72 since. In all of these cases, the
standing of the association to sue was at issue, and the Supreme Court, with
the exception of the damages claim discussed above,' 73 decided in favor 174
of
the plaintiff association. In addition to the two cases discussed above,
there were four more, for a total of six, in the area of labor law, three of
them handed down between 1995 and 1999. In one of these cases, the
association sued for the removal by the defendant corporation of
surveillance cameras installed to supervise its employees. 7 5 The other
three involved attacks on labor contracts and the right of employees to be
consulted before a mass layoff. 7 6 Of the remaining three cases, two
involved the Unfair Competition Act, 177 and one antitrust law, 178 in which
area the Verbandsklage was subsequently confirmed, then abolished, by the
Simplifying just a little bit, any case with a value in controversy of 8,000 Swiss Francs, or
more ($6,400), can be appealed, although there are cases where there is no minimum value
in controversy. Bundesgesetz iber die Organisation der Bundesrechtspflege Dec. 16, 1943,
SR 173.110, arts. 44-47 (Switz.). For the most part, however, the Court can only-but
fully-review the application of federal law by the cantonal courts, which includes, as one
may remember, substantive private law as well as constitutional law. See supra text
accompanying note 17; id arts. 43-67. As of January 1, 2007, the requisite value in
controversy will rise to sFr. 15,000 ($12,000) in labor matters and 30,000 Swiss Francs
($24,000), in all other cases. Below that value, a case may newly be appealed to the Supreme
Court in cases involving an important question of federal law, among other exceptions. See
Bundesgesetz iber das Bundesgericht June 17, 2005, AS 2005, 4045, art. 74 (Switz.).
170 Moreover, the Court has made roughly three quarters of its unpublished opinions
available on the Internet since 2000, allowing for somewhat of a check on what the Court
"publishes" and what it does not. See http://relevancy.bger.ch/php/aza/http/index.php?lang=
de.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 104-54
172

See supra note 170.

173 See supra text accompanying notes 115-28.

As noted in note 121, however, the
plaintiff association still won that case because the Supreme Court decided it represented its
own claim based on negotiorum gestio.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 104-54.
175 Federal Court Nov. 8, 1998, 114 BGE II 345 (Switz.).
176 Federal Court Jan. 11, 1999, 125 BGE III 82 (Switz.); Federal Court Apr. 21, 1997,
123 BGE III 176 (Switz.); and Federal Court Apr. 27, 1995, 121 BGE III 168 (Switz.).
177 Federal Court May 2, 2000, 126 BGE III 239 (Switz.) (adjudicating a suit by a trade
association to protect an internet domain name); Federal Court June 13, 1967, 93 BGE 11 135
(Switz.) (involving a claim that professional titles used by certain architects and engineers
amounted to unfair competition).
178 Federal Court Sept. 27, 1977, 103 BGE II 294 (Switz.) (involving a claim of illegal
vertical restraints in the market of distributing motion pictures).
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federal legislature. 1
No matter what one's preferred procedural values, it is difficult to
assess whether these numbers show that the system works as it should
without further empirical studies. The relative spike in labor-related
association suits between 1995 and 1999 may have originated in one of the
most severe downturns of the post-World War II economy in Switzerland.
One may further speculate from the relatively small number of association
suits and from the fact that all of them have been decided in favor of the
plaintiff associations since 1960 that associations and their lawyers have not
exactly attempted to utilize the Verbandsklage aggressively. Along the
same lines, advocates of gender equality have complained that the
Verbandsklage has yet to be used to enforce federal comparable-worth
legislation passed in 1995,180 despite survey data showing large swaths of
income inequality in private industry and government jobs alike. 181 Some
have speculated that this may be due to the relatively limited financial
power of gender-equality NGOs compared to the unions and trade
associations that have successfully brought association suits in the labor and
179 FRANK ET AL.,

supra note 154, at 151.

Cf supra note 156 and accompanying text.
181See, e.g., Florence Aubry Girardin, Egalit salariale et dcisions judiciaires:
180

questions pratiques de point de vue de la justice, 14 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS [AJP]

1062, 1062 (2005); Margrith Bigler-Eggenberger, Art. 4 Abs. 2/8 Abs. 3 BV-Eine
Erfolgsgeschichte?, 106 SCHWEIZERISCHES
ZENTRALBLATI
FUR
STAATSUND
VERWALTUNGSRECHT,

57,

76

(2005);

Sabine

Steiger-Sackmann,

5

Jahre

Gleichstellungsgesetz-5 Jahre Lohngleichheit?, 10 AJP 1263, 1267 (2001). Whether the
absence of association suits means that women have been deprived of a procedure to enforce
their federal right to salaries of comparable worth is, however, a different question. A search
engine of women's organizations compiling all lawsuits by women under the new federal
legislation in German-speaking Switzerland lists 157 comparative-worth cases filed since
1995 as of July 31, 2006.
See Der Gleichstellungsbros in der Deutschschweiz,
http://www.gleichstellungsges etz.ch (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). This includes a number of
association suits in administrative court. See infra text accompanying notes 187-92. Thirtysix of these cases resulted in a judgment for plaintiff and thirty-one in a judgment for
defendant; fifty-five cases were settled either during formal court proceedings or, more
frequently, during the free consultation hearings before the consultation agencies that may
informally hear the case prior to a formal court filing according to the 1995 legislation; nine
cases remain to be decided, and in twenty-six the outcome is unknown. In the latter
category, the case descriptions occasionally indicate that the plaintiff decided not to pursue
her claim beyond the consultation stage. Yet, for most of these cases there is no such
indication. Thus, I decided to code them separately rather than as cases won by defendants.
Finally, sixty-five of the cases listed involved private suits and ninety-two involved
administrative or public law proceedings. At the very least, this demonstrates that quite a
few women have been able and willing to pursue their rights in court-although a
disproportionate number of them are or were in government jobs (see infra notes 187-9l)and that the success rate of those suing has been considerable. However, whether current
procedural mechanisms prevented others with valuable claims from suing and whether,
indeed, those mechanisms are to blame for the inadequate enforcement of federal law in this
area cannot be answered without further empirical study.
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unfair competition areas. 82 It is indeed true that the plaintiff association
risks footing the bill of a lost case in a country in which the loser must pay
the winner's attorney's fees and in which contingent fees are unethical. 3
Given that the Swiss litigation systems are relatively lean and based more
on law than on equity, 84 this is not as daunting a proposition as it would be
in the United States. 85 Yet, the potential costs are still considerableparticularly in comparable-worth cases, where the outcome is highly factdependent and where opinions vary greatly as to what amounts to
discrimination. 186
It is also interesting that although there have been no association suits
against private companies asserting violation of the comparable-worth
principle,' 87 there has been some group litigation initiated by associations
against state and city governments in the administrative courts.' 88 Is this
because the state for institutional reasons is expected to be less likely to
retaliate against litigating employees than a private firm? Is it because the
basic hiring criteria and salary information for comparable government jobs
are publicly available, thus compensating for the lack of American-style
182
183

See, e.g., Steiger-Sackmann, supra note 181, at 1267.
At least, federal legislation mandates that no court costs may be assessed in such

cases. Bundesgesetz uber die Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann Mar. 24, 1995, SR 151.1,
art. 12(2) (Switz.).
184 See supra note 84 and accompanying text; Samuel P. Baumgartner, Related Actions, 3
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 203, 210 [hereinafter Baumgartner, Related
Actions] (pointing to an underlying "procedural philosophy that views a civil proceeding
more as an efficient adjudication of the plaintiffs claim than as an equitable resolution of a
dispute" as a result of which there is a "more limited party and claims structure" in
Switzerland and other civil law countries than there is in the United States). One may add
the more limited nature of evidence-gathering as another reason for lower litigation costs.
See supra notes 139-40 and infra text accompanying notes 263-65.
185 Cf Baumgartner, Group Litigation, supra note 65, at 256 ("[T]o what extent would
class actions level the playing field in countries in which comparatively low costs of
litigation, fee shifting, and legal aid operate to make the system available to enforce
relatively low monetary claims and in which the quality of the attorney is not as important to
guide the client through a process based on law as it is in one steeped in equity?").
186 See, e.g., Federal Court Oct. 5, 1999, 125 BGE I1 530 (Switz.) (discussing at great
length the factors relevant to the decision whether a 25% salary differential between
kindergarten teachers, almost exclusively female in Switzerland, and grade school teachers,
among whom men are better represented, is justified); Bigler-Eggenberger, supra note 181,
at 78-79.
187 There have, however, been individual suits by women against private employers, three
of which made it to the Supreme Court. See Federal Court Dec. 22, 2003, 130 BGE III 145
(Switz.) (upholding a 200,000 Swiss Franc (roughly $165,000) judgment for back pay);
Federal Court Jan. 19, 2001, 127 BGE 1II 207 (Switz.) (remanding for further evidentiary
hearings); Federal Court Sept. 14, 1999, 125 BGE III 368 (Switz.) (denying relief).
188 See, e.g., Federal Court Oct. 5, 1999, 125 BGE 11 530 (Switz.) (deciding an
association suit by kindergarten teachers in Zurich); Federal Court Dec. 18, 1998, 125 BGE I
71 (Switz.) (deciding an association suit by nurses at state hospitals in Bern).
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discovery? 89 Does it have to do with the fact that cases against the
government are litigated in administrative court, where the procedure is
somewhat more "inquisitorial"' 90 and the government is subject to charges
that cannot be leveled against a private employer, such as that its actions are
not covered by legislation?' 9' Or are judges and attorneys in administrative
litigation, where more complex party structures have always been a feature,
simply more comfortable with multiparty litigation than are judges and
attorneys in civil litigation? My own tabulation of mostly individual
comparable-worth suits filed in the last ten years indicates that the latter
hypothesis has less explanatory power than those previously mentioned, for
the same picture emerges in individual litigation: among 157 such cases
filed in German-speaking Switzerland, 92 (including a few association
suits) were filed in the administrative courts, while 65 (none of them
association suits) were filed in the civil courts.1 92 Thus, despite the fact that
roughly ninety percent of the Swiss population works for private
employers,' 93 the cases filed against federal and state governments
outnumbered the private cases by 3:2. Without larger empirical studies,
however, it is impossible to do more than speculate on why that is so and
thus on the effectiveness of the Verbandsklage in this and other areas.
4. Law Reform Proposals
Despite this lack of empirical information, the law reformers appear to
know precisely what is needed in the proposed Federal Code of Civil
Procedure. They are confident that there currently is no need for a class
action device in Switzerland. 9 4 At the same time, they originally proposed
189See, e.g., Jeanne Ramseyer & Corina Muller, Bewdhrt aber noch zu wenig bekannt:
Uberblick fiber die Resultate der Evaluation des Gleichstellungsgesetzes, 15 AJP 1331, 1333

(2006) (presenting survey evidence according to which the finding of information often
presents a problem when a potential plaintiff suspects wage discrimination). But see Federal
Court Jan. 19, 2001, 127 BGE III at 210-11 (Switz.) (indicating that plaintiff was able to
have the (private) corporate defendant compelled to divulge its confidential salary policy,
among other pertinent evidence, in cantonal proceedings).
In particular, the court may order the release of evidence not proffered by the parties.
190
See, e.g., GYGI, supra note 27, at 208-10. Cf supra note 140. At least in theory, however,
the latter is true in private labor litigation as well.

See Code of Obligations, art. 343(4);

Bundesgesetz uiber die Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann Mar. 24, 1995 SR 151.1, art.
12(2) (Switz.).
191See, e.g., Federal Court Sept. 29, 1995, 121 BGE I 230 (Switz.) (holding that

legislation in the Canton of Zug requiring doctors at state hospitals to turn in a part of their
profits gained from private practice at the hospital to the state was sufficient for the relevant
state agency to charge such doctors 35% of such profits because the legislation itself set a
numerical limit of 40%).
192See supra note 181.
193See BUNDESAMT FOR STATISTIK, TASCHENSTATISTIK DER SCHWEIz 12 (2006).

194See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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to extend the Verbandsklage to all substantive areas,' 95 thus abolishing the
limitation to Article 28 of the Civil Code and to substance-specific federal
statutes.196 This decision was heavily criticized, primarily by conservatives
and business interests.197 The latest draft thus returns to a stated attempt to
codify the federal common law developed by the Swiss Supreme Court as
described above.' 98 However, the draft lists the requirements for the
standing of the association somewhat more leniently:
-

The association must have national or regional importance and

- it must, by its bylaws, be authorized to represent the interests of
certain groups of people. 99
However, distinct provisions in substance-specific federal statutes
would remain controlling. z° In defense of the drafters, I need to point out
that empirical research has not thus far played much of a role in procedural
law reform in Switzerland. However, while this helps explain the lack of
concern for such research in the current reform, it does not make the quality
of law reform decisioris based on anecdotal evidence any better.
C. Association Suits in Administrative Procedure (Verbandsbeschwerde)
The Verbandsbeschwerde is the counterpart to the Verbandsklage in
Swiss administrative procedure. It allows an association to challenge a
decision in which an administrative agency applies law to a specific case,
first within the agency, then before an administrative tribunal, including the
The requirements are the same as for the
Federal Supreme Court.20
Verbandsklage, although the prerequisites for association suits involving
state administrative law before state administrative tribunals follow state
However, one significant difference
rules that may vary slightly.20 2
between civil and administrative procedure affecting the admissibility of the

195 See Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, Vorentwurf der Expertenkommission, art.
79(1), June 2003, available at http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/staat-buerger/
gesetzgebung/zivilprozess.Par.0001 .File.tmp/entw-zpo-d.pdf.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 108-13, 155-59.
197 See Vernehmlassungsbericht, supra note 21, at 7, 230-37.
198 See Botschaft, supra note 22, at 7288-89.

199 Id.
200

Id.

201

Current procedural statutes distinguish between an administrative appeal and a

constitutional appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, depending on whether the appellant

claims a violation of federal (statutory) administrative law or federal constitutional law. The
Verbandsbeschwerde has been available in both. See, e.g., Federal Court Feb. 11, 1972, 98
BGE lb 63 (Switz.); Federal Court Feb. 3, 1967, 93 BGE 1 125 (Switz.).
202

See, e.g., 93 BGE 1 128.
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Verbandsbeschwerde relates to standing. In civil proceedings, only the
person who claims to be the owner of the allegedly infringed right has
standing to sue.2 °3 In administrative procedure, however, courts and
statutes have followed Jhering's views of law as the protection of legitimate
interests. 204 Thus, on the federal level, anybody with a legitimate interest
can challenge a governmental decision first in intergovernmental
proceedings and then in administrative court.20 5 The interest is legitimate if
the plaintiff has a personal interest in the decision that is stronger than that
of most anybody else.20 6 In deciding whether a particular interest is
legitimate, the courts have taken a pragmatic approach. Thus, home owners
are routinely allowed to challenge construction permits granted to neighbors
on the grounds that they violate zoning laws or environmental statutes.20 7
Equally, competitors are considered to have standing to challenge the
decision to license new entrants.20 8 On the other hand, those who live too
far away to be suffering any direct negative effects of a planned project are
not considered to have standing to challenge a building permit.20 9 By virtue
of this more open-ended standing requirement in administrative procedure,
the requirement that the individual members of the association have
standing to sue may be easier to meet for the Verbandsbeschwerdethan it is
for the Verbandsklage.21 °
It is perhaps partly for this reason that the Verbandsbeschwerde, as
opposed to the Verbandsklage, has been used extensively in practice. In the
last fifteen years alone, the Federal Supreme Court has published over fifty
decisions involving administrative association suits. In terms of substance,
they run the gamut, including trade and consumer organizations challenging
the decision of the Federal Food and Drug Administration to allow
Monsanto to sell food ingredients made from genetically modified
soybeans, 21' to local unions and trade associations complaining about a
decision of the Transportation Department to allow retailers in Swiss train
203 See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 66.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.

205 Bundesgesetz Ober das Verwaltungsverfahren Dec. 20, 1968, SR 172.021, art. 48(a)
(Switz.); Bundesgesetz ilber die Organisation der Bundesrechtspflege Dec. 16, 1943, SR
173.110, art. 103(a) (Switz.).
206 See, e.g., GYGI, supra note 27, at 158.
207 See, e.g., Federal Court Oct. 15, 1986, 112 BGE lb 409 (Switz.); Federal Court Oct.
27, 1978, 104 BGE lb 245 (Switz.).
208 See, e.g., Federal Court May 2, 1975, 101 BGE lb 87 (Switz.).
209 See, e.g., Federal Court Apr. 30, 1985, 111 BGE lb 290 (Switz.) (plaintiff living one
kilometer away from planned interstate highway has no standing to challenge the decision to
build it); Federal Court Dec. 19, 1978, 104 BGE lb 381 (Switz.) (individuals who do not live
near a farmhouse planned to be demolished may not sue with a claim that the demolition
violates federal legislation protecting historical buildings).
210 But see supra note 155.

211 See Federal Court Sept. 10, 1997, 123 BGE II 376 (Switz.).
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212
stations to remain open irrespective of cantonal closing-time regulations,
and attacks by environmental groups against construction permits allowing
the building of roads, stadiums, military training facilities, and other large
projects. 2 13 Indeed, the latter have been frequent enough to allow the
Zurich Liberal Democrats to collect a sufficient number of signatures to
force a popular vote on their constitutional proposal to limit association
suits by environmental
organizations. r4 As indicated above,
Verbandsbeschwerden also include appeals by gender equality
organizations
of salary decisions of state and city governments 21 5 and many
2 16

others.

Why this extensive use of the Verbandsbeschwerde as opposed to the
Verbandsklage? Part of the explanation may lie in the more lenient
standing requirements
in administrative
procedure.
Moreover,
governmental decisions have a tendency to affect more individuals than
decisions of private persons. And such decisions must be made in the
public interest. Thus, the difference may have to do with the fact that an
entire host of constitutional provisions (such as the equal treatment clause)
and administrative statutes (such as environmental legislation) are primarily
or exclusively directed at governmental agencies making decisions on
whether to grant a particular permit. 2 17
Short of those possible
explanations, it would help to have some empirical information on whether
there are procedural reasons why the association suit is utilized frequently

See Federal Court Sept. 30, 1993, 119 BGE lb 374 (Switz.).
See, e.g., Federal Court Dec. 3, 2004, 131 BGE I1 81 (Switz.) (soccer stadium);
Federal Court Apr. 8, 2003, 129 BGE II 331 (Switz.) (local airport); Federal Court Dec. 28,
1998, 125 BGE II 50 (Switz.) (military training facility); Federal Court Aug. 19, 1998, 124
BGE II 460 (Switz.) (interstate highway); Federal Court Apr. 21, 1997, 123 BGE 11 337
(Switz.) (commercial building complex); Federal Court June 21, 1995, 121 BGE 11 224
(Switz.) (commercial building complex).
214 See, e.g., AP/Baz, Initative gegen das Verbandsbeschwerderecht giltig, Basler
Zeitung online (visited June 2, 2006). On the ability to force such a popular vote see supra
note 64.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
216 See, e.g., Federal Court Apr. 20, 2005, 131 BGE 1 291 (Switz.) (suit by association of
212
213

home owners against state property tax increase); Federal Court Mar. 9, 2005, 131 BGE I
198 (Switz.) (appeal by a local association of pharmacists of decision of state of Solothum to
allow general practitioners to dispense pharmaceuticals in less restricted fashion than
pharmacists ); Federal Court Oct. 25, 2004, 130 BGE 11514 (Switz.) (suit by association of
television viewers against state-run television station for giving masked opponents of World
Economic Forum in Davos airtime without questioning their views or backgrounds); Federal
Court July 28, 2004, 130 BGE 1 290 (Switz.) (suit by various associations claiming illegal
interference by the Zurich government with a popular referendum on the adoption of
changes to the Zurich Code of Criminal Procedure by sending voters a one-sided description
of what is at stake).
217 Cf supra text accompanying note 191.
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in administrative and constitutional courts, but not in the civil courts. 2' 8 If
so, it would further help to have empirical knowledge on whether there is a
need to adapt civil procedure accordingly or whether the administrative
courts take care of most of the need for group litigation in Swiss society.2 9
For that purpose, it is not helpful that civil procedure and administrative
procedure are applied by different judges and researched by different
scholars.220 Yet, it is research that needs to be done if one wants to
understand whether the current approaches to group litigation in
Switzerland are adequate.
D. Shareholder Litigation
A discussion of group litigation in Switzerland would be incomplete
without a look at a small but important group of actions whose res judicata
effects extend beyond the parties. This sort of action (Gestaltungsklagen)
has been significant primarily in status matters, where a decree on a
person's status, such as marital status or paternity, must be effective in
relation to everyone else. 22' However, the same principle has long been
applied to suits by individual shareholders of a corporation against
decisions at the corporation's shareholder meetings.222 Thus, a decree
voiding a decision by the shareholders as illegal will nullify that decision
not only with regard to the plaintiff but in relation to all remaining
shareholders as well.223 In this sense, the suing shareholder acts as the
representative of the others, although rarely in the interest of all of them.
Similarly, although not a Gestaltungsklage, a derivative suit, in which a
shareholder sues the officers or the members of the board for violating their
fiduciary duties, has the effect of a damages judgment that is to be paid to
the corporation and thus indirectly favors all shareholders. 24
It is said, however, that this type of shareholder litigation has been too
risky to initiate because the Swiss Supreme Court held early on that the
amount in controversy is to be determined by the value of the litigation to
the corporation rather than on the basis of the value of the shares of stock
owned by the plaintiff.225 This raises the threshold considerably in a legal
See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
219 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Class Actions, supra note 31, at 126-27.
220 See supra text accompanying note 27.
218

221
222

See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 103-04.
Id. at 104.

See Schweizerische Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations], art. 706(5) ("The
judgment voiding a decision of the shareholder meeting has effect for and against all
shareholders."). According to subsection I of Article 706, the judge is to void such a
decision if it violates the law (in practice, primarily provisions protecting certain
shareholders) or the corporation's bylaws.
224 See OR, arts. 754-60.
225 See, e.g., Andreas Casutt, Rechtliche Aspekte der Verteilung der Prozesskosten im
223
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system in which court costs and attorneys fees in litigated cases are
determined largely on the basis of the value in controversy.2 26 In order to
lower the risk for potential plaintiffs, the federal legislature thus tempered
the loser-pays rule as part of the corporate law reform of 1992. Since then,
the trial court has had to distribute attorney's fees227discretionally between
plaintiff and defendant if the plaintiff loses the case.
Some have argued that this change insufficiently tempers the risks for
potential plaintiffs since the fees to be paid can still be significant 228 and,
more importantly, since the plaintiff has no idea what the court's discretion
will bring at the time of judgment. 229 Again, some empirical insight would
be helpful here for purposes of law reform.2 30 Apparently, however, there
seems to be enough of a problem here that some plaintiff groups have taken
action. In 1989, for example, an association of Nestle shareholders, the
purpose of which had been the monitoring of the company's economic and
social ethics, changed its bylaws to include as its objective the pursuit of the
economic interests of its members. 23' This allowed the association to bring
a suit against Nestl6, challenging the corporation's shareholder decision to
issue 175,000 new shares without allowing existing shareholders the right
to preferential purchase of those shares, 232 while distributing the costs of the
litigation equally among the association's members.23 3 The association
itself owned one share of Nestl6 stock.234 As a result, the association
formally represented its own interests as a shareholder rather than those of
its members, thus avoiding the problem that neither Swiss law nor the law
Anfechtungs- und Verantwortlichkeitsprozess, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR PETER FORSTMOSER 79
(1993). Again, it would be helpful to know whom precisely this does in fact disadvantage in
practice. As far as number of lawsuits, I have been able to find thirty-eight published
Article-706 cases by the Supreme Court alone for the period from 1954-2006, most of them
involving suits by minority shareholders. Thirty-three of these decisions were decided before
the big reform of corporate law of 1992, which was meant to render such suits less
financially risky to file. See infra text accompanying note 227.
226 See, e.g., Verordnung tiber die Anwaltsgebtihren June 10, 1987, ON 215.3, § 2
(Canton of Zurich); Dekret iber die Anwaltsgebtihren Nov. 6, 1973, BSG 168.81, art. 10
(Canton of Bern), availableat http://www.sta.be.ch/belex/d/1/16881 .html.
227 See OR, art. 706a(3) (as amended on Oct. 4, 1991).
228 See, e.g., Federal Court Oct. 12, 2004, 4P.208/2003 (Switz.) (upholding decision in
which the trial court estimated the value in controversy at 10-20 million Swiss Francs ($816 million) and determined the plaintiffs share of the defendant's attorney's fees to be
160,000 Swiss Francs ($128,000)).
229 See, e.g., Casutt, supra note 225.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 217-20.
23 1 Federal Court June 25, 1991, 117 BGE 1I 290, 291 (Switz.).
232 Id.

233 Among these costs was an order by the district judge of Vevey requiring the plaintiff

to post a sFr.500,000 ($400,000) bond. See Federal Court Feb. 22, 1990, 116 II 94, 95
(Switz.).
234 See 117 II at 291.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

27:301 (2007)

of the Canton of Vaud provides for association suits in this area.2 35 This is
a smart way for a group of like-minded shareholders to share the risks and
costs of this kind of litigation; I have been told by two Swiss attorneys that
the strategy has been used since. It is one way to get around the lack of a
true group-litigation device in this area, for which there is obviously a need.
The federal legislature has apparently recognized the problem. In the
new Act on Mergers and Acquisitions of 2003,2 6 the legislature introduced
an additional remedy for aggrieved shareholders in merger and acquisition
cases. 237 Rather than bring an action to declare the shareholder decision
sanctioning the merger or acquisition void-which the courts have been
extremely reluctant to grant 238-minority shareholders can sue for damages
for any losses incurred by disadvantageous treatment arising from the
transaction. 239 In this litigation, the court costs and the attorney's fees of
the plaintiff in case of a loss must be borne by the acquiring corporation,
thus removing the plaintiffs risk of having to pay for the defendant's
attorney's fees.24 °
More interestingly, the judgment for damages in such a case is valid in
favor of all shareholders equally situated, whether or not they participated
in the litigation. 241 Thus, the suing plaintiff truly acts as a representative of
the others. In this sense, this limited action in the area of mergers and
acquisitions is in fact a class action.242 Apparently,
243
the legislature felt that,
despite what the procedural reformers say today, there is indeed a need
for such a device in this particular area of law. More likely, the drafters
recognized the need for the device without noticing that what they were
235 See supra text accompanying notes 108-13, 155-59.

236 Bundesgesetz iber Fusion, Spaltung, Umwandlung und Verm6gensuibertragung Oct.
3, 2003, SR 221.301 (Switz.) [hereinafter Fusionsgesetz].
237 Id. art. 105.
238 See, e.g., PETER BOCKLI, SCHWEIZER AKTIENRECHT 354 (3d ed., 2004).
239 Fusionsgesetz, supra note 236, art. 105(1).

240 Id., art. 105(3). But see id., second sentence: "In special circumstances, the court may
charge the costs of the proceedings against the plaintiffs." According to the explanatory
report, this provision is primarily intended to target frivolous lawsuits. See Botschaft zum
Bundesesetz uber Fusion, Spaltung, Umwandlung und Verm6gensfibertragung, BBI 2000,
4337, 4488.
241 Fusionsgesetz, supra note 236, art. 105(2) (Switz.). Whether a judgment in favor of

the defendant has res judicata effect against all other shareholders equally situated is not
clear to me given the language of the provision ("The judgment has effect for all
shareholders .... " Does this mean onlyfor all shareholders, not againstthem?) and the lack
of any legislative history on this point. However, this question may have little practical
relevance. The action must be brought within two months of the publication of the merger
decision. See id. art. 105(1). By the time a judgment is entered, that deadline will long have
passed for another claimant to bring suit on the basis of the same merger decision.
242 See BOCKLI, supra note 238, at 355.
243 See supra text accompanying note 69.
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introducing is in fact a very limited class action.
E. Joinder of Parties and Consolidation by the Court
While the Verbandsklage, the Verbandsbeschwerde in federal court,
and the shareholder suits discussed above are primarily or exclusively
controlled by federal law, joinder, intervention, and consolidation devices
have largely remained a matter of state law.244 To my knowledge, all state
procedural codes provide for the joinder of parties. Usually, they require
that the joined parties claim, or are defendants with regard to, the same or
similar set of facts or legal rights. 45 The most important distinction the
codes make here is between mandatory and voluntary joinder. 246 Joinder is
mandatory where, as a matter of substantive law, a group of individuals
holds a right or owes a duty jointly so that only the group can validly
dispose of the right or fulfill the duty.24 7 This concept has its roots in both
Roman and Germanic law2 48 and includes claims by and against the
community of heirs regarding the rights on the inheritance that is formed as
a matter of law among all heirs of the deceased, 49 the owners of
community property, z 5° and claims by a simple association. 1 The
procedural effect of this indivisible property is that these groups must sue or
be sued together.252 The claim by or against them is then effectively treated
as a single lawsuit resulting in one uniform judgment or settlement for or
against all.253

244

1 say "largely" because recent federal legislation on personal jurisdiction provides for

jurisdiction in cases of joinder of defendants wherever the court has jurisdiction over one of
the defendants. See Bundesgesetz Ober den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen Mar. 24, 2000, SR
272, art. 7(1) (Switz.) Naturally, the provision requires a federal interpretation of what is
required for a joinder to lead to the application of Article 7(1). See, e.g., Franz Kellerhals &
Andreas Gungerich, Art. 7, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESGESETZ OBER DEN GERICHTSSTAND
INZIVILSACHEN 47, 53-54 (Franz Kellerhals et al. eds., 2001).
245 See, e.g., VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 146.
246 See,

247

e.g., HABSCHEID, supra note 73, at 151.

Id. at 153.

248 On the influence of Germanic law on the Swiss Civil Codes see Wieacker, supra note
141 and accompanying text. In Pandectist thought, this limited number of group rights was
not considered an exception to the individualistic nature of rights. The group was simply
conceived of as the individual holding the group right. See, e.g., VON TUHR, supra note 133,
at 78-80.
249 See Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZBG] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
602.
250 See id art. 215.
251 See Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911,

SR 220, art. 544. The "simple association" is an unincorporated association of individuals
pursuing a common purpose. OR, art. 530(1).
252 See, e.g., VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 143.

253 See, e.g.,

KUMMER,

supra note 73, at 158. This is the result of viewing the group as
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In practice, this appears to be quite an important kind of joinder in
Switzerland.254 However, all procedural codes also allow for voluntary
joinder based on the same (or, in some cantons, a related) 255 factual claim or
right. 256 Thus, it is possible for a plaintiff to sue all those she considers to
be jointly and severally liable, for all holders of the same insurance policy
to challenge a specific interpretation of a provision in that policy, or for all
those harmed by the same alleged tort to sue the defendant together. 7
While this may seem like group litigation, however, it is so only to a
limited extent. First, it is not representative litigation because only those
who sue or are sued actually participate in it. Second, as a result of the
individualist precepts underlying the state procedural codes,25 8 each party is
treated individually, thus conducting her own lawsuit. Hence, the judgment
may differ as to each individual party; each party may decide to settle or to
abandon the suit without prejudice to the others; and each party may decide
whether or not to appeal, again without prejudice to the right to appeal of
the others. 259 Further, in some cantons it is the practice of the courts to keep
separate dossiers for every single party. 260 Moreover, voluntary joinder is
usually limited to cases within the same subject-matter jurisdiction. 26 1 At
the same time, however, allegations and suggestions of a line of evidencegathering of one litigant may benefit the others in some jurisdictions. 6 2
In sum, voluntary joinder may result in some efficiency by having the
same court decide similar claims and by consolidating the taking of
evidence-which, as one may remember, is much less extensive in a system
in which the gathering of evidence is controlled by the judge2 63 who is also
the finder of fact 264 and where lines of inquiry must meet a high standard of

an individual holder of a single right. See discussion supra note 248.
254 See infra text accompanying notes 272-74.
255

See, e.g., Zivilprozessordnung ffir den Kanton Bern of July 7, 1918, BSG 271.1, art.

37 [hereinafter BEZPO]; KUMMER, supranote 73, at 156.
256 See, e.g., VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 146.
257

See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 156. The latter two examples may go too far in

those cantons that limit voluntary joinder to cases in which the plaintiffs' claim must arise
out of the same rather than merely relatedfacts and legal rights. See, e.g., HABSCHEID, supra
note 73, at 152.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 129-40.
259 See, e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 157.
260 See, e.g., ROMY, supra note 42, at 242; Jean-Marc Schaller, FINANZ-ANALYSTEN-

REcHT 180 (2004).
261

See, e.g., VOGEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 146.
e.g., KUMMER, supra note 73, at 158. But see

262 See,

HABSCHEID, supra note 73, at 152
(arguing that allegations and proffers by one party do not affect the others in Zurich).
263 See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 59, at 753-54.
But see supra notes 139-40 and

accompanying text.
264 As I have written elsewhere:
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materiality.265 It may also be beneficial for claimants to pursue their cases
together for a number of practical reasons, including an attempt to avoid
inconsistent judgments regarding the same set of operative facts.266
However, given that voluntary joinder results in many essentially
independent lawsuits, the efficiency gains are limited,26 7 as are other
potential benefits and drawbacks of representative litigation, so often
discussed today.268

Thus, the American trial judge must be more generous in determining the
relevancy of proffered evidence than his German [and Swiss] colleague, who does
not need to account for the fact that the attorneys need to persuade a lay jury rather
than the judge himself. Furthermore, the separation of what in Germany land
Switzerland] is the process of taking evidence before the court into a phase of
gathering the facts (discovery) and into one of presenting it to the jury at trial, a
separation that is due to the need for a continuous jury trial, the attorneys must be
allowed to discover evidence for an entire case before trial. Thus, issues of
relevancy for purposes of discovery on the one hand and for purposes of
admissibility at trial on the other do not converge as they do in Germany [and
Switzerland].
supra note 56, at 81-82 (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 139, 264; Gerber, supra note 59, at 762-63.
Thus, the
266 See, e.g., Federal Court Dec. 31, 1998, 125 BGE 11195, 97 (Switz.).
of
the lean
of
the
drawbacks
avoid
one
joinder
to
voluntary
can
use
plaintiffs
plaintiff or
litigation package in Swiss procedure. See supra note 184 and accompanying text;
Baumgartner, Related Actions, supra note 184, at 210 (noting that "as part of the same
philosophy [of viewing a civil proceeding as an efficient adjudication of the plaintiff's claim
rather than equitable resolution of a dispute, the] res judicata effects are more limited than in
common law jurisdictions, particularly the United States").
267 See, e.g., ROMY, supra note 42, at 243. The current rules do not necessarily compel
this result. In the United States, for example, Professor Burbank observes:
BAUMGARTNER, HAGUE CONVENTION,
265

In the materials on party joinder and consolidation, students are repeatedly
exposed to the substantive implications of joinder and led to consider the extent to
which efficiency concerns cause courts to bend the requirements of procedural
rules, to pursue dubious packaging strategies that are supposedly provisional but
that in substantive terms may be irremediable, and, alternatively, to pursue dubious
substantive strategies that enable packaging.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (1987)
(reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985)).
268 See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); Burbank, supra note 267; John H. Coffee, Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John H. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Allen Erbsen, From "Predominance" to
"Resolvability:" A New Approach To Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995
(2005); Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death:" Class Certification & Blaclonail, 78
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While there is agreement among the state procedural codes on the
basics of joinder, the same is not true with regard to the consolidation of
related proceedings by the court. Some states do not provide for such
consolidation at all.269 Others allow it in cases in which voluntary joinder
would have been permissible. 270
Even in those states, however,
consolidation is limited to common hearings, including evidentiary
hearings, and scheduling. 271 As with voluntary joinder, the combined
lawsuits remain independent with different outcomes possible.
Again, there is no available statistical evidence on the use of joinder
and consolidation devices in Switzerland. Similarly, any empirical research
on how well these devices work in practice and whether and to what extent
they meet the needs of litigants and the judicial system is impossible to
find. To get at least some sense of the practical significance of these
devices, I again looked at the published decisions of the Swiss Supreme
Court in civil litigation during the last fifty years. This research turned u
2
only one case in which a court had consolidated separately filed suits. R
There were, however, forty-nine joinder cases, twenty-seven of which
involved mandatory joinder.
The remaining twenty-two cases with
voluntary joinder, however, almost all hemmed to a very narrow pattern of
group litigation, involving only a handful of litigants, usually two or three.
Moreover, most of the parties were joined to avoid inconsistent
judgments,27 3 which is partly a result of the relatively narrow bite of res
judicata in Switzerland. 7 And in a few instances, family members sued
together in a case affecting them all.2 75 Only in three cases did a few
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357 (2003).
269 The Bemese Code of Civil Procedure, for example, did not contain such a provision
until it was so amended in 1995. See BEZPO, supra note 255, art. 38(2) (as amended).
270 See, e.g., HABSCHEID, supra note 73, at 152.
271 Id.

272 Federal Court Jan. 9, 1960, 86 BGE II 59 (Switz.) (noting consolidation in lower court
of three independently filed suits by tenants against the same landlord).
273 See, e.g., Federal Court Nov. 13, 2000, 127 BGE I 92 (Switz.) (suit by individual and
his partly-owned corporation against bank and trustee for misappropriation of co-owned
funds); Federal Court Dec. 1, 1998, 125 BGE II 95 (Switz.) (complaint by Lego and its
Swiss distributor against an alleged patent infringer); Federal Court Apr. 2, 1991, 117 BGE
II 204 (Switz.) (suit claiming unfair competition against parent and subsidiary); Federal

Court June 19, 1981, 107 BGE III 91 (Switz.) (suit by creditors in bankruptcy against alleged
debtor); Federal Court July 10, 1979, 105 BGE la 193 (Switz.) (bankruptcy trustee suing

four members of the board and auditor of failed company for violation of fiduciary duty);
Federal Court Dec. 21, 1961, 87 BGE 11355 (Switz.) (suit by heirs challenging bequest).
274 See discussion supra note 266.

275 See, e.g., Federal Court Sept. 30, 2005, 131 BGE III 667 (Switz.) (suit by surviving
spouse and children of man killed in traffic accident with tramway against city of Geneva
and city-owned tramway company); Federal Court Dec. 3, 1984, 110 BGE II 505 (Switz.)
(suit by 17-year old and thus minor skier harmed by ski accident, his father, and his health
insurance company against operator of air-tram company); Federal Court Nov. 14, 1974, 100
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unrelated individuals sue a defendant without primary concern for
inconsistent results,276 and in one of
277them, it appears that the three plaintiffs
had chosen their attorney together.
Thus, it appears that voluntary joinder is used only for very narrow
purposes and that consolidation is rare in civil litigation. Again, things look
different in administrative cases. There, consolidation is more common,
particularly in proceedings involving claims of neighbors and others
challenging the same construction permit.2 78 Joinder of parties, including
voluntary joinder, too, appears to be more prevalent inTpublic law cases, yet
only occasionally involving larger groups of litigants.
It would be interesting to know the reasons for the narrow use of
voluntary joinder and for the virtual absence of consolidation in civil, but
not administrative, cases. It may be that parties and judges feel that these
devices introduce too much complexity, and thus too much cost,280 into the
litigation to be worth the limited benefits. Perhaps lawyers and judges in
civil cases are not sufficiently comfortable with a larger litigation package,
or at least it is far from their radar screen. 281 Or it may be that Swiss legal
education with its emphasis on teaching legal doctrine produces few
282
lawyers that are intent on testing the rules for the benefit of their clients.
BGE II 453 (Switz.) (claim by couple and their two children against federal military
insurance arising out of traffic accident caused by intoxicated driver of military vehicle).
276 Federal Court Apr. 23, 1996, 122 BGE 1I1229 (Switz.) (three home owners suing
Canton of Vaud for allegedly causing nearby river to overflow); Federal Court May 21,
1974, 100 BGE 11 134 (Switz.) (heirs of recently deceased owner and two neighbors suing
Canton of Obwalden for causing flooding and dirt avalanches onto their respective
farmland); Federal Court Jan. 23, 1962, 88 BGE II 54 (Switz.) (suit by union and various
trade associations against low-price competitor alleging unfair competition).
277 See 100 BGE II at 134.
278See, e.g., Federal Court Aug. 13, 1973, 99 BGE lb 200 (Switz.) (aggregated suits of
many individuals and an association against decision to build interstate highway).
279 See, e.g., Federal Court Aug. 14, 2002, 129 BGE Ii 18 (Switz.) (suit by German and
Swiss association of book sellers challenging decision of the federal competition
commission finding illegal vertical restraint); Federal Court Nov. 9, 2001, 128 BGE 1I 90
(Switz.) (suit by a few neighbors and neighboring township against rezoning decision to
allow airport to build airport restaurant); Federal Court Nov. 27, 1974, 100 BGE lb 404
(Switz.) (suit by twelve land owners against state decision to expropriate a strip of their
respective land for the building of a power line); Federal Court Dec. 19, 1968, 94 BGE 1 525
(Switz.) (suit by forty-seven citizens challenging as biased the question posed to voters in a
referendum to change the state constitution).
280 Cf Burbank, supra note 267, at 1466-87 (engaging costs of complex litigation).
281See supra text accompanying note 184.
282 Cf Baumgartner, Related Actions, supra note 184, at 210 ("Most Swiss attorneys I
have spoken to ... have never thought of testing the domestic stay provision to its full extent
simply to serve their client's interest."). On the emphasis in continental European law
teaching-which, as one may remember, goes back some 900 years--on lecturing, teaching
doctrine, and scientific concepts see, for example, Mirjan Damagka, A ContinentalLawyer
in an American Law School: Trials and TribulationsofAdjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1363,
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And again, lawyers and judges in administrative cases may just be more
comfortable with multiparty litigation to begin with.283 It would be useful
for the reformers engaged in fashioning a new Federal Code of Civil
Procedure to gain some empirical knowledge on this score.
F. Test Cases
One way in which litigants and courts in Switzerland have attempted
to achieve efficiency gains and uniformity of results recently is through the
use of test cases, also known as "pilot suits" or "model suits." For that
purpose, the defendant agrees with the claimants that a test case brought by
one of the claimants will be binding between the defendant and all
claimants.2 84 The first such case in the civil courts occurred in the late
1980s when a considerable number of Swiss vegetable farmers incurred
great losses as a result of the nuclear explosion in Chernobyl, after which
many Swiss consumers, in the wake of media reports of increased
radioactive residue in vegetables, refused to buy leafy greens. The federal
government, faced with a large number of claims by the affected farmers
under the Nuclear Liability Act, 2 5 entered into a test-case contract with the
claimants with regard to the question of government liability. 28 6 After the
courts found the federal government to be liable, the latter negotiated
settlements with all individual claimants for a total of 8.7 million Swiss
francs ($6.96 million).287
The judgment in the test case does not have res judicata effect for or
288
Moreover,
against those claimants not formally parties to the litigation.
some have raised the question whether the contractual obligation to accept
the judgment as binding is judicially enforceable. 289 This may explain why
the use of this device has thus far mostly been limited to a few cases against

1364-70 (1968); John Henry Merryman, Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison,
27 STAN. L. REV. 859, 869-75 (1975).
283 See supra text accompanying notes 217-20.
284 See, e.g., Philippe Spitz, Das Kartellzivilrecht und seine Zukunft nach der Revision

des Kartellgesetzes 2003, 2005 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 113,

125 (2005).
285 Kernenergiehaflpflichtgesetz Mar. 18, 1983, SR 732.44. Article 16(1)(d) of that Act
provided at the time that the federal government would pay, up to a certain limit, damages
for harm occurring in Switzerland as a result of a nuclear accident abroad. The provision has
since been amended to require that damages be unobtainable from the foreign operator of the
nuclear facility.
286 See Federal Court June 21, 1990, 116 BGE 11480, 482-83 (Switz.).
287 See, e.g., Schweizerische Depeschenagentur (sda), dispatch of Dec. 17, 1990.
288 See, e.g., Spitz, supra note 284, at 125. In order to avoid the running of the statute of
limitations, all claimants may file suit individually, immediately requesting a stay, pending
resolution of the pilot litigation. Id.
289 See, e.g., SCHALLER, supra note 260, at 183.
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the federal government. 29°
Apparently the federal government is
sufficiently likely to abide by the agreement in case of a judgment against it
for the claimants to accept the risk of trying 291 (and sufficiently
unconcerned about the ability of the other claimants to succeed in the face
of an unfavorable judgment). It may also be that the same factors that favor
the use of other group litigation devices in the administrative courts are at
play here.292
A look at the case law of the Swiss Supreme Court shows that there
have only been five published decisions involving test cases since 1990,
three of which concerned a single case.2 93 A further decision involved a
somewhat related vehicle: the ability of an administrative agency in a case
with more than twenty plaintiffs "with the same interest" to order plaintiffs
to name a representative pursuant to Article 1la of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act,294 in which case there is true representative
litigation with the ensuing judgment binding on all parties. The decision
involved another instance of a mass claim for damages against the federal
government, in this instance by cattle farmers alleging the government had
failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the spread of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease) in Switzerland and
295 thus
caused the precipitous drop of beef prices suffered by the plaintiffs.
But see Federal Court Mar. 19, 1993, 119 BGE lb 46 (Switz.) (mentioning a suit by
employees challenging decision of Zurich pension fund in early 1980s).
291See, e.g., Walter, supra note 12, at 374.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 211-18. Technically, the Chernobyl case was
litigated in the civil courts as a result of statutory provisions based on an outdated theory that
conceived of monetary claims against the government as civil in nature. See, e.g., FRITZ
GYGI, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 36-37 (1986). However, it involved an area of law that is today
considered a matter of public law and has thus usually been handled by public law experts.
Id. Accordingly, federal law now provides that damages claims against the federal
government must be brought in administrative proceedings. See Bundesgesetz fiber die
Verantwortlichkeit des Bundes sowie seiner Behordenmitglieder und Beamten Mar. 14,
1958, SR 170.32, art. 10 (as amended on Oct. 4, 1991) (Switz.).
293 See Federal Court Nov. 22, 2005, 132 BGE 11 47 (Switz.) (suit by a private
telecommunications company challenging the Federal Telecommunications Agency's
decision to limit the provision of certain telecommunications services, including last-mile
access, to recently half-privatized government telecommunications company); Federal Court
Nov. 30, 2004, 131 BGE 11 13 (Switz.); Federal Court Mar. 13, 2001, 127 BGE 11 132
(Switz.); Federal court June 28, 1999, 125 BGE II 385 (Switz.) (suit challenging the salary
classification of physical therapists, 75% of whom are women, by Canton of Solothurn as
violating federal requirement of comparable worth); Federal Court June 21, 1990, 116 BGE
11480, 482-83 (Switz.) (for discussion see text accompanying notes 285-86).
294 Bundesgesetz Ober das Verwaltungsverfahren Dec. 20, 1968, SR 172.021, art. 1 la (as
amended on Oct. 4, 1991) (Switz.).
295 Federal Court Jan. 18, 2000, 126 BGE II 63 (Switz.). The decision refers to an
unpublished 1992 decision in which the Court dealt with a similar mass claim of cheese
makers to fail to take the necessary measures to prevent a listeria outbreak in Vacherin Mont
d'Or cheese. See id. at 69.
290
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In sum, test cases are relatively new and experience with them is
limited-as is the discussion of difficult questions about the effects this
approach has on the right of individual claimants to pursue their own
litigation strategies,96 on the taking of evidence for the entire class,297 and
299
on settlement,
among many other effects of representative
300 litigation
context.
action
class
the
in
proceduralists
Swiss
concern
that
G. Jurisdiction in Mass-Tort Litigation
As a remnant of earlier proposals to provide for some sort of class or
group litigation in mass tort cases, 30 1 the Swiss legislature provided for an
exclusive basis of personal jurisdiction for all claims arising out of the same
mass tort when federalizing the law of jurisdiction in 2001. Article 27 of
the Federal Act on Personal Jurisdiction 30 2 requires that all claims in such
cases be brought at the place where the alleged tort was committed or, if
that place is unknown, at the domicile of the defendant.
This provision thus attempts to identify a single court with personal
jurisdiction, while leaving the remaining questions on how to proceed with
mass tort claims for the states. As we now know, the states do not have a
class action device,30 3 nor would an association suit be available in most
mass tort cases. 304 Moreover, few cantons allow for the aggregation of
individual, but related lawsuits by the court, and those that do may
nevertheless require the court to keep individual dossiers. 30 5 Furthermore,30 it6
is questionable whether mass tort plaintiffs would ever meet the written
or unwritten 30 7 joinder requirements of most state codes. What is left, then,
is the judicial economy gained by having the same court adjudicate
individually all lawsuits arising out of the same set of operational facts. But
not even that is guaranteed, since the statute does not order the states to
have the same judges sit on those cases.
The provision does, however, create considerable uncertainty both by
296 See, e.g., Steiger-Sackmann, supra note 181, at 1267.
297 See, e.g., Spitz, supra note 284, at 125.
298 See, e.g., Astrid Stadler, Referat, in VERHANDLUNGEN

DES 62.

DEUTSCHEN

JURISTENTAGES IN BREMEN 1998, 11/1, 36, 44 (1998) (asserting that pilot litigation cannot be

settled).

See, e.g., FLORIAN JACOBY, DER MUSTERPROZESSVERTRAG (2000).
300 See supra text accompanying notes 54-68.
301See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
302 Bundesgesetz tiber den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen [GestG] Mar. 24, 2000, SR 272
299

(Switz.).

303 See supra text accompanying notes 18-35.
304 See supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 268-71;
306 See supra text accompanying notes 255-57.

307 See supra text accompanying notes 272-77.

SCHALLER,

supra note 260, at 180.
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using the new term "mass tort" without defining it and by relying on the
place where the tort was committed, which may be notoriously difficult to
determine.30 8 In short, the provision may create more harm than good. Not
surprisingly the proposed Federal Code of Civil Procedure intends to
abolish it.304 To my knowledge, the provision has not yet been applied in
practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Switzerland is currently in the process of drafting its first Federal Code
of Civil Procedure, an enterprise similar in importance to the promulgation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the United States in 1938. This
is a great opportunity to reflect on the usefulness of existing state procedure
codes, indeed to engage the premises underlying those codes and their
effectiveness in practice. Reconsideration of existing procedural devices
and process values is particularly important in the area of group litigation.
For it is in this area that there has always been some tension between
existing devices and the individualist concepts underlying the codes.310
Moreover, reforms have occurred interstitially and limited to certain
subject-matter areas, largely through federal legislation and federal
common law. 31 1 This has resulted in a patchwork of federal and state rules
and principles, the effectiveness of which has never been carefully
assessed.3 ' Indeed, most group litigation devices have remained relatively
marginal in both civil procedure courses and procedural scholarship in
Switzerland,31 3 although not necessarily in practice.3 14
Unfortunately, it is in the area of group litigation that the reformers
have decided to forego introspection, opting instead to write the current
patchwork of federal and state statutory and common law into the code 3so
15
as to promote easy adoption in a country controlled by consensus politics.
The work of various scholars in specific areas of substantive law suggests
that this may be bad policy. 316 The same goes for litigants in practice, who
308 See, e.g., THOMAS MOLLER & MARKUS WIRTH, GERICHTSSTANDSGESETZ 692-96, 70102 (2001).
309 Botschaft, supra note 22, at 7269-70.
310 See supra text accompanying notes 129-54.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
312 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
313 See supra text accompanying notes 160, 167-70.

314 See supra Parts 11.2.c and 11.3.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 48-97, 194-98.
316 See, e.g., BRIGITTE KURZEN, E-HEALTH UND DATENSCHUTZ 217 (2004) (arguing that

representative litigation such as class actions and test cases could improve number of suits to
enforce legislation protecting personal information from illegal dissemination); DIETER ZOBL
& STEFAN KRAMER, SCHWEIZERISCHES KAPITALMARKTRECHT 435 (2004) (noting that
because financial harm to individual investors is often low and individual proof of causation
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search for avenues to improve access to justice, efficiency, and consistency
of result either within existing procedural devices or by creating new ones,
such as association suits in shareholder litigation or test cases.
What is interesting from a comparative perspective, however, is that
the reluctance of the Swiss law reformers to expand upon existing group
litigation, let alone to introduce an American-style class action, is based on
more than consensus politics. At the ideational level, Kantian liberalindividualist precepts have led to a strong emphasis of the procedural ideal
of enforcing individual substantive rights with dispatch.31
The resulting
3
litigation package in the Swiss procedure codes is comparatively slim. '
Group litigation inevitably introduces complexity and cost and thus is in
tension with this ideal. 320 Representative litigation is even more so because
it allows some individuals to enforce other people's rights, whether or not
they agree.32 ' This is further in tension with the classical liberal ideal of
limiting governmental intervention because it leads to enforcement action
by the government (through litigation) against private individuals where
there may not have been any before. 322 Moreover, due to its complexity,
representative litigation
may require a stronger judicial role than traditional
323
liberal ideals allow.
But things are more complex. Old German communitarian ideals have
also influenced substantive Swiss law, and notions of "social civil
procedure" have led to a few changes in the procedural codes that give the
judge some powers to support the weaker party in litigation.3 24 The
question is whether this admittedly limited alternative influence has been
strong enough to support an expansion of group litigation in the future.32 5
More importantly, the same German communal ideals have led to the
notion of the social state, which has had a strong influence on public law in
Switzerland as well as in Germany. 326 As a result, the public interest is no
potentially costly, securities fraud cases are likely to remain rare in Switzerland); Spitz,
supra note 284, at 125 (proposing legislative integration of test case litigation in antitrust
matters so as to improve clarity on issues of evidence-gathering, costs, and enforcement);
Steiger-Sackmann, supra note 181, at 1267 (arguing that the availability of test cases and

Verbandsklage are insufficient to guarantee women access to court so as to effectively
enforce their rights under comparable-worth legislation).
317 See supra text accompanying notes 231-35, 284-92.
318

See supra text accompanying notes 129-40.

319 See supra text accompanying notes 184, 274.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.

321See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
322 See supra text accompanying note 139.
323See supra text accompanying notes 67, 129-40.
324 See supra text accompanying notes 141-47, 190.
325See supra text accompanying note 145.
326 On the development of German medieval communal ideals into the notion of the
social state (Sozialstaat) by Otto von Gierke and other Germanist scholars influenced by

346
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longer enforced in criminal proceedings alone, but (in the form of social,
economic, and environmental legislation) in administrative tribunals as
well. Hence, the traditional liberal separation between civil procedure as
the place where individual rights are enforced and public law procedure
where public interests are enforced has remained strongly influential.327
But the public law side of the equation has expanded drastically from the
protection of private property and public health to the promotion of social
and environmental causes and market regulation.32 8 Moreover,
administrative procedure with its more lenient standing requirements has
allowed a larger group of potential claimants to sue and thus enforce this
newly conceived public interest. 329 The question is whether public law
litigation in the administrative courts is sufficient to enforce this public
interest.
On an institutional level, a rule-based legal education and the
traditional expectations of judges as efficient adjudicators and of attorneys
as professionals and officers of the court may make both uncomfortable
with complex litigation and efforts to engage in social engineering in the
civil process and thus explain the relatively limited use of existing group
and joinder devices in practice. 330 Legislators, on the other hand, still take
their business seriously, 33' although some would certainly argue that the
emergence of American-style public relations have made serious inroads on
the quality of the legislative discourse. In addition, due to the presence of
direct democratic institutions, the legislative process is considered to have
particular legitimacy to deal with complex social issues. 332 Conversely,
Swiss culture has not yet come "to regard litigation as a fact, however
unpleasant, of everyday life. 333 As a result, the notion of effecting social
Johann Gottfried Herder's ideas of national identity in the 19th Century see, for example,
Ewald, supra note 131, at 2055-61.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 27-33, 187-91, 201-20.
328 1 intentionally list market regulation separately because the Swiss model of a social
market economy, written into the federal constitution in 1947 (see Bundesverfassung der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, [aBV], [Constitution of 1874] May 29, 1874, as
amended on July 6, 1947, art. 31 (Switz.)), has resulted in considerably more economic
regulation than the American model of a free market economy. The ordo-liberal concepts
developed by the Freiburg School in Germany, on which this model is based, has been ably
presented by Professor Gerber. See David J.Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy:
German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25

(1994).
329 See supra text accompanying notes 203-10.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 278-83.
331See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
333Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1476 (1991)

(reviewing

GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (1989)).
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change through the civil litigation system has remained foreign to many in
Switzerland.
There is also the question of how much of a social need there is for
group litigation, especially class action litigation, in a country in which
shared values outside of the law guide the behavior of individuals and
corporations alike.335 Similarly, a denser level of social and environmental
regulation than in the United States and the ability of individuals to
challenge or enforce that regulation in administrative court, including
through association suits, may reduce the need for enhanced group litigation
devices in Swiss civil procedure. 336 At the same time, however,
globalization and the opening of national markets have put pressure on the
short-term bottom line of Swiss businesses and, in turn, on the federal
legislature to become more business friendly.337 As a result, there may be
more of a need for group litigation to enforce the public interest in the
future.
Finally, the rejection of a class action device is partly the result of
reactions to litigation practice in the United States and the perceived
pathologies thereof. To some extent, this is due to true concern with
differences observed in American law and practice, including concern with
a litigation system steeped in equity and its recent tendency to result in
3 38 Partly, however, it is the result of the
dispute resolution simpliciter.
influence of the U.S. tort reform movement during a time when German
334 See supra text accompanying notes 61-65, 281-83.

See, e.g., Marco Verweij, Why Is the River Rhine Cleaner than the Great Lakes
(DespiteLooser Regulation)?, 34 LAW & Soc. REv. 1007 (2000).
336 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Class Actions, supra note 31, at 123. On a related note, the
proliferation in Switzerland of offices of ombudsmen and women, created by governments,
businesses, and trade associations to give consumers an opportunity to be heard, taken
seriously, and perhaps receive the relief they desire may have relieved the pressure for
litigation-related solutions to consumer problems if the success stories of those institutions
are to be believed. See, e.g., Ombudsstelle Kommunikation und Umwelt, Jahresbericht
2003, available at http://www.omk.ch/download/jahresbericht_2003.pdf (dealing with
concerns about radiation by wireless telecommunications services); Schweizerischer
Versicherungsverband, Ombudsstelle, 2006, http://www.svv.ch/index.cfm?id=629 (set up
by Swiss insurers); Stadt Zurich, Beauftragte fMr Beschwerdefalle: Ombudsfrau, Bericht
2005, available at http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/internet/ombudsstelle/home/ahresberichte.
ParagraphContainerList.ParagraphContainerO.ParagraphList.00 12.File.pdf/OmbudsfrauBeri
cht2005.pdf (set up by the City of Zurich); Verband 6ffentlicher Verkehr, Jahresbericht
2004, Ombudsstelle 6ffentlicher Verkehr, available at http://www.ombudsstelle.ch/
jahresbericht_2004.pdf (set up by the Swiss public transportation system). See also supra
note 62.
337 See, e.g., Baumgartner, Class Actions, supra note 31,
at 123.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 83-89. "[T]he alternatives in current fashion
represent a logical terminus in the progression from law in the sense that Justice Harlan
described it, through equity, to dispute resolution simpliciter." Burbank, supra note 267, at
1486.
335
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businesses attempted to receive help from their government against lawsuits
pending in the United States, a time during which U.S. courts fashioned an
approach to transnational litigation that paid little attention to legitimate
foreign sovereignty concerns, thus evoking protective reflexes in Germany
and Switzerland.33
To someone studying the interplay among transnational actors and
domestic procedural lawmaking,340 these are interesting causal
interrelations; some of the damage may be irremediable. One would hope,
however, that the Swiss law reformers can overcome their anti-American
instincts in this area sufficiently to engage in informed procedural
comparison. In doing so, it should be obvious that a procedural system
based on the ideal of enforcing individual rights is unlikely to produce the
same complexity, cost, and potential for negotiations outside the shadow of
the law 34 as one steeped in equity when group litigation devices are
expanded.34 2 At the same time, the Swiss reformers need to consider
carefully whether their liberal, rights-based procedure along with fee
shifting and the lack of contingent fees has something to do with the limited
use of existing group litigation devices in civil practice versus their rather
extensive use in administrative tribunals and, if so, whether that is
desirable.343 In short, there is plenty of work ahead for the Swiss reformers
in the area of group litigation. I hope they will perform their task well.

339 See supra text accompanying notes 91-99; Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation,

supra note 9, at 1317-38.

340 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.

341 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 84, at 989 (noting that when civil procedure insufficiently
"confine[s] and focus[es] the law so that one may predict results," bargaining "is in the
shadow of a shadow").
342 It is not correct, however, to say that, in the context of a civil law system, class action
proceedings are necessarily expensive and burdensome for the defendant, or that they permit
high recoveries and large legal fee awards. These effects are the result of the background
American legal system as applied to class action procedure. Gidi, supra note 1,at 321.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 187-91, 201-20.
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